Conscious and nonconscious control of action

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I criticize Block's examples of P-consciousness and A-consciousness for being flawed and the notion of A-consciousness for not being a notion of consciousness at all. I argue that an empirically important distinction can be made between behavior that is supported by an underlying conscious experience and behavior that is brought about by nonconscious action-control mechanisms. This distinction is different from that made by Block.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,990

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-20

Downloads
33 (#473,474)

6 months
6 (#700,858)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Author's response.Ned Block - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1).
P-consciousness presentation/a-consciousness representation.Denise Gamble - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):149-150.
Empirical status of Block's phenomenal/access distinction.Bruce Mangan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):153-154.
Sidestepping the semantics of “consciousness”.Michael V. Antony - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):289-290.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.

View all 153 references / Add more references