Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):519-540 (2004)
Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionalism, but I see no reason for him to resist a properly deflated version of it that I sketch. Moreover, such intentionalism seems to me to stand a better chance than Clark's reliance on properties in explaining the peculiar ways in which experience appears to us that so concern the qualiaphile
|Keywords||Intentionalism Metaphysics Phenomena Qualitative Clark, A|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Consciousness and Dennett's Intentionalist Net.John Bricke - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (September):249-56.
Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum.Michael Watkins - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.
Thoughts on Sensory Representation: A Commentary on S a Theory of Sentience Joseph Levine.Austen Clark - unknown
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads37 ( #135,624 of 2,152,252 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #399,478 of 2,152,252 )
How can I increase my downloads?