A deflated intentionalist alternative to Clark's unexplanatory metaphysics

Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):519-540 (2004)
Abstract
Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionalism, but I see no reason for him to resist a properly deflated version of it that I sketch. Moreover, such intentionalism seems to me to stand a better chance than Clark's reliance on properties in explaining the peculiar ways in which experience appears to us that so concern the qualiaphile
Keywords Intentionalism  Metaphysics  Phenomena  Qualitative  Clark, A
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DOI 10.1080/0951508042000304207
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