Probability, Truth, and the Openness of the Future

Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):197-204 (2010)
Alexander Pruss’s recent argument against the open future view (OF) is unsound. Contra Pruss, there is no conflict between OF, which holds that there are no true future contingent propositions (FCPs), and the high credence we place in some FCPs. When due attention is paid to the semantics of FCPs, to the relation of epistemic to objective probabilities, and to the distinction between truth simpliciter and truth at a time, it becomes clear that what we have good reason for believing is not that some FCPs are true, but rather that some FCPs have a good chance of becoming true
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI 10.5840/faithphil201027218
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,590
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
An Open Infinite Future is Impossible.Alexander R. Pruss - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (4):461-464.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

28 ( #182,773 of 2,168,526 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #346,757 of 2,168,526 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums