Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):197-204 (2010)
Alexander Pruss’s recent argument against the open future view (OF) is unsound. Contra Pruss, there is no conflict between OF, which holds that there are no true future contingent propositions (FCPs), and the high credence we place in some FCPs. When due attention is paid to the semantics of FCPs, to the relation of epistemic to objective probabilities, and to the distinction between truth simpliciter and truth at a time, it becomes clear that what we have good reason for believing is not that some FCPs are true, but rather that some FCPs have a good chance of becoming true
|Keywords||Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy and Religion|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
An Open Infinite Future is Impossible.Alexander R. Pruss - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (4):461-464.
Similar books and articles
Probability and the Open Future View.Alexander R. Pruss - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):190-196.
Why the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem Fails.Joachim Horvath - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):115-120.
Medieval Commentators on Future Contingents in De Interpretatione.Simo Knuuttila - 2010 - Vivarium 48 (1-2):75-95.
Future Freedom and the Fixity of Truth: Closing the Road to Limited Foreknowledge Open Theism. [REVIEW]Benjamin H. Arbour - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):189-207.
Contingency and Divine Knowledge in Ockham.Michael J. Cholbi - 2003 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1):81-91.
Back to the Open Future1.Elizabeth Barnes & Ross P. Cameron - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):1-26.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads28 ( #182,773 of 2,168,526 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #346,757 of 2,168,526 )
How can I increase my downloads?