Multiple Meanings of Alar after the Scare: Implications for Closure

Science, Technology and Human Values 21 (2):177-197 (1996)
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Abstract

The group politics approach to controversy analysis describes the closure of public controversies involving scientific or technological issues as an interest group's triumph over competing groups in the political arena. In contrast, the social construction of technology model of closure maintains that closure occurs through the negotiation of a consensus regarding the form of an object and the corresponding elimination of its interpretative flexibility. Drawing upon the "Alar scare" of 1989, this article extends the SCOT model beyond the life of an object. This article argues that together, the group politics and SCOT views of closure permit interest groups to continue to attach divergent meanings to a controversial object even after it has been eliminated The analysis suggests that such an object may provide interest groups with a powerful symbol and an invaluable political resource.

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