Is the science of positive intentional change a science of objective moral values?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (4):435-436 (2014)
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Abstract

I examine whether Wilson et al.'s argument for a science of positive intentional change constitutes an argument for a science of objective moral values. Drawing from their discussion, I present four reasons for thinking that it may be and some considerations on why it may not be. Concluding, I seek help from the authors. [Open Peer Commentary on a BBS article.]

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William A. Rottschaefer
Boston University (PhD)

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Affording Affordance Moral Realism.William A. Rottschaefer - 2020 - Biological Theory 16 (1):30-48.

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