'Of course there are fictional characters'

Revue Internationale de Philosophie 262 (4):615-40 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There is no straightforward inference from there being fictional characters to any interesting form of realism. One reason is that “fictional” may be an intensional operator with wide scope, depriving the quantifier of its usual force. Another is that not all uses of “there are” are ontologically committing. A realist needs to show that neither of these phenomena are present in “There are fictional characters”. Other roads to realism run into difficulties when negotiating the role that presupposition plays when we make intuitive evaluations of the truth or falsehood of sentences involving fiction, for we may presuppose things we do not believe. This means that a judgment of truth, implicitly relative to a presupposition we do not believe, can be sincerely made by someone who, from a more austere perspective, would regard the judgment as false.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Fictional characters and literary practices.Amie L. Thomasson - 2003 - British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2):138-157.
In defence of fictional realism.Benjamin Schnieder & Tatjana von Solodkoff - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):138-149.
Speaking of fictional characters.Amie L. Thomasson - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (2):205–223.
Could Sherlock Holmes Have Existed?Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):175-181.
A Defense of Causal Creationism in Fiction.David Sackris - 2013 - Philosophical Writings 41 (1):32-46.
Much ado about nothing: Critical realism examined.Richard Hanley - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (2):123 - 147.
Pretense, existence, and fictional objects.Anthony Everett - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):56–80.
The great beetle debate: A study in imagining with names.Stacie Friend - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):183-211.
How to be a Nominalist and a Fictional Realist.Ross P. Cameron - 2013 - In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Art and Abstract Objects. Oxford University Press. pp. 179.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-09-11

Downloads
467 (#38,835)

6 months
51 (#79,015)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark Sainsbury
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Inheriting the World.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2020 - Journal of Applied Logics 7 (2):163-70.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Fiction and Metaphysics.Amie L. Thomasson - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fiction and Metaphysics.Amie L. Thomasson - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):282-284.
Creatures of Fiction.Peter van Inwagen - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4):299 - 308.
Reference Without Referents.R. M. Sainsbury (ed.) - 2005 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 10 references / Add more references