Acta Analytica 28 (4):411-21 (2013)
AbstractAccounts of modality in terms of fictional possible worlds face an objection based on the idea that when modal claims are analysed in terms of fictions, the connection between analysans and analysandum seems artificial. Strong modal fictionalism, the theory according to which modal claims are analysed in terms of a fiction, has been defended by, among others, Seahwa Kim, who has recently claimed that the philosophical objection that the connection between modality and fictions is artificial can be met. I propose a new way of spelling out the intuition of artificiality and show that strong modal fictionalism should be rejected.
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