Can Beliefs Be Based on Practical Reasons?

In Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York: pp. 215-234 (2019)
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Miriam Schleifer McCormick
University of Richmond

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Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.

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