Results for 'belief'

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Bibliography: Belief in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Ethics of Belief in Epistemology
Bibliography: Belief Revision in Epistemology
Bibliography: Degrees of Belief in Philosophy of Probability
Bibliography: Belief Theories of Perception in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Belief, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Collective Belief in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: De Re Belief in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: The Nature of Belief in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Tacit and Dispositional Belief in Philosophy of Mind
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  1.  9
    Philosophical abstracts.Daniel Goldstick Belief - 1989 - American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (3).
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  2. The agm theory and inconsistent belief change kojitanaka.Inconsistent Belief Change - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (192):113-150.
     
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  3.  19
    Stephen Neale.Rational Belief - 1996 - Mind 105 (417).
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  4. Louis Goble.Belief Ascriptions - 1997 - In Dunja Jutronić (ed.), The Maribor papers in naturalized semantics. Maribor: Pedagoška fakulteta Maribor. pp. 285.
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  5.  21
    Current periodical articles.Justified Inconsistent Beliefs - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4).
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  6. Georg Meggle.Common Belief - 2003 - In Matti Sintonen, Petri Ylikoski & Kaarlo Miller (eds.), Realism in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 321--251.
     
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  7. Quantum Theory and the Appearance of.Widespread Belief - 1986 - In Daniel M. Greenberger (ed.), New techniques and ideas in quantum measurement theory. New York, N.Y.: New York Academy of Sciences. pp. 6.
     
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  8. A Rejoinder to Hart,'.Belief Faith & Religious Truth - 1994 - Philosophy and Theology 8 (3):257-266.
     
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  9.  10
    6 Personal Epistemology in Preservice Teachers.Belief Changes Throughout - 2011 - In Jo Brownlee, Gregory J. Schraw & Donna Berthelsen (eds.), Personal epistemology and teacher education. New York: Routledge. pp. 84.
  10. Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational (...)
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  11. Belief through Thick and Thin.Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):748-775.
    We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). (...)
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  12. Metaphysics, religion, and Yoruba traditional thought.in Non-Human Agencies Belief & in an African Powers - 2003 - In P. H. Coetzee & A. P. J. Roux (eds.), Philosophy from Africa: A text with readings 2nd Edition. London, UK: Oxford University Press.
     
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  13. Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.
    This paper argues for two theses: that degrees of belief are context sensitive; that outright belief is belief to degree 1. The latter thesis is rejected quickly in most discussions of the relationship between credence and belief, but the former thesis undermines the usual reasons for doing so. Furthermore, identifying belief with credence 1 allows nice solutions to a number of problems for the most widely-held view of the relationship between credence and belief, the (...)
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  14. Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
    It is tempting to posit an intimate relationship between belief and assertion. The speech act of assertion seems like a way of transferring the speaker’s belief to his or her audience. If this is right, then you might think that the evidential warrant required for asserting a proposition is just the same as the warrant for believing it. We call this thesis entitlement equality. We argue here that entitlement equality is false, because our everyday notion of belief (...)
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  15. Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
    In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that epistemologists (...)
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  16. What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
    This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs—_inflationary_ views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and _deflationary_ views, where justified group belief is understood as nothing more than the aggregation of the justified beliefs of the group's members. If this essay is right, we need to look in an altogether different place for an adequate account of justified group (...)
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  17. Sven ove Hansson.Taking Belief Bases Seriously - 1994 - In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala: Papers From the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13.
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  18.  57
    Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity.I. Testimony-Based Belief - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 25.
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  19.  18
    Paul M. Churchland.Translucent Belief & Catherine Z. Elgin - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (1).
  20. An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.Laurence Jonathan Cohen - 1992 - New York: Clarendon Press.
    In this incisive new book one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily (...)
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  21. Justified Belief in a Digital Age: On the Epistemic Implications of Secret Internet Technologies.Boaz Miller & Isaac Record - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):117 - 134.
    People increasingly form beliefs based on information gained from automatically filtered Internet ‎sources such as search engines. However, the workings of such sources are often opaque, preventing ‎subjects from knowing whether the information provided is biased or incomplete. Users’ reliance on ‎Internet technologies whose modes of operation are concealed from them raises serious concerns about ‎the justificatory status of the beliefs they end up forming. Yet it is unclear how to address these concerns ‎within standard theories of knowledge and justification. (...)
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  22. Transforming Conflict Through Insight, Kenneth R. Melchin and Cheryl A. Picard. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008, xii+ 149 pp., $45.00,£ 28.00. Love and Objectivity in Virtue Ethics: Aristotle, Lonergan, and Nussbaum on Emotions and Moral Insight, Robert J. Fitterer. Toronto: University of. [REVIEW]Reflective Knowledge & Apt Belief - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):215.
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  23. Belief as Commitment to the Truth.Keshav Singh - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    In this essay, I develop an account of belief as commitment to the truth of a proposition. On my account, to believe p is to represent p as true by way of committing to the truth of p. To commit to the truth of p, in the sense I am interested in, is to exercise the normative power to subject one’s representation of p as true to the normative standard of truth. As I argue, my account of belief (...)
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  24. II—Pluralism about Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.
    With his Humean thesis on belief, Leitgeb seeks to say how beliefs and credences ought to interact with one another. To argue for this thesis, he enumerates the roles beliefs must play and the properties they must have if they are to play them, together with norms that beliefs and credences intuitively must satisfy. He then argues that beliefs can play these roles and satisfy these norms if, and only if, they are related to credences in the way set (...)
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  25. Belief, Truth and Knowledge.D. M. Armstrong - 1973 - London,: Cambridge University Press.
    A wide-ranging study of the central concepts in epistemology - belief, truth and knowledge. Professor Armstrong offers a dispositional account of general beliefs and of knowledge of general propositions. Belief about particular matters of fact are described as structures in the mind of the believer which represent or 'map' reality, while general beliefs are dispositions to extend the 'map' or introduce casual relations between portions of the map according to general rules. 'Knowledge' denotes the reliability of such beliefs (...)
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  26. Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis?Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - In Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. pp. 192-213.
    Let propositionalism be the thesis that all mental attitudes are propositional. Anti-propositionalists typically point at apparently non-propositional attitudes, such as fearing a dog and loving a spouse, and play defense against attempts at propositional analysis of such attitudes. Here I explore the anti-propositionalist’s prospects for going on the offensive, trying to show that some apparently propositional attitudes, notably belief and judgment, can be given non-propositional analysis. Although the notion that belief is a non-propositional attitude may seem ludicrous at (...)
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  27. Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires (...)
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  28. Michael Goldstein.Belief Revision - 1994 - In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala: Papers From the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 117.
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  29. Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985). Then I will focus on the problem of iterated belief revisions.
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  30.  50
    Belief: A Pragmatic Picture.Aaron Zimmerman - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Aaron Zimmerman presents a new pragmatist account of belief, in terms of information poised to guide our more attentive, controlled actions. And he explores the consequences of this account for our understanding of the relation between psychology and philosophy, the mind and brain, the nature of delusion, faith, pretence, racism, and more.
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  31. Memory, belief and time.Brian Weatherson - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):692-715.
    I argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained pieces of evidence that can be the start of reasoning. The main argument is a variant on Frank Arntzenius’s Shangri La example, an example that is often used to motivate the thought that evidence does supervene on current features.
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  32. Contextualism about justified belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-20.
    This paper presents a new argument for a form of contextualism about ‘justified belief’, the argument being based on considerations concerning the nature of belief. It is then argued that this form of contextualism, although it is true, cannot help to answer the threat of scepticism. However, it can explain many other puzzling phenomena: it can give an account of the linguistic mechanisms that determine how the extension of ‘justified belief’ shifts with context; it can help to (...)
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  33. Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desire.David Sobel & Copp - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):44-53.
    The authors argue against direction of fit accounts of the distinction between belief and desire.
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  34.  83
    Belief contraction without recovery.Sven Ove Hansson - 1991 - Studia Logica 50 (2):251 - 260.
    The postulate of recovery is commonly regarded to be the intuitively least compelling of the six basic Gärdenfors postulates for belief contraction. We replace recovery by the seemingly much weaker postulate of core-retainment, which ensures that if x is excluded from K when p is contracted, then x plays some role for the fact that K implies p. Surprisingly enough, core-retainment together with four of the other Gärdenfors postulates implies recovery for logically closed belief sets. Reasonable contraction operators (...)
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  35.  41
    There is more to belief than Van Leeuwen believes.Neil Levy - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (4):584-589.
    Neil Van Leeuwen argues that many religious people do not act and infer as we would expect believers to act and infer, and on this basis argues that they are not genuine believers. They take some other, nondoxastic, attitude to the claims they profess to believe. In this short commentary, I argue that in many (but far from all) such cases, the content, and not the attitude, explains the departures from the inferential and behavioral stereotype we associate with belief.
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  36.  73
    Rational belief systems.Brian David Ellis - 1979 - Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield.
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  37. Does Faith Entail Belief?Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):142-162.
    Does faith that p entail belief that p? If faith that p is identical with belief that p, it does. But it isn’t. Even so, faith that p might be necessarily partly constituted by belief that p, or at least entail it. Of course, even if faith that p entails belief that p, it does not follow that faith that p is necessarily partly constituted by belief that p. Still, showing that faith that p entails (...)
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  38. Belief Revision for Growing Awareness.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2021 - Mind 130 (520):1207–1232.
    The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described as conservative change from one probabilistic belief or credence function to another in response to newinformation. Roughly: ‘Hold fixed any credences that are not directly affected by the learning experience.’ This is precisely articulated for the case when we learn that some proposition that we had previously entertained is indeed true (the rule of conditionalisation). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions (...)
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  39. Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.
    I argue that believing that p implies having a credence of 1 in p. This is true because the belief that p involves representing p as being the case, representing p as being the case involves not allowing for the possibility of not-p, while having a credence that’s greater than 0 in not-p involves regarding not-p as a possibility.
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  40. The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe-Effect Cases.Mark Alfano, James R. Beebe & Brian Robinson - 2012 - The Monist 95 (2):264-289.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy has shown that people are more likely to attribute intentionality, knowledge, and other psychological properties to someone who causes a bad side effect than to someone who causes a good one. We argue that all of these asymmetries can be explained in terms of a single underlying asymmetry involving belief attribution because the belief that one’s action would result in a certain side effect is a necessary component of each of the psychological attitudes (...)
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  41.  76
    Religious Belief as an Evolutionary Accident.Paul Bloom & Osman Zahid Çifçi - 2015 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):163.
  42.  11
    The belief in intuition: individuality and authority in Henri Bergson and Max Scheler.Adriana Alfaro Altamirano - 2021 - Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
    This book is an intellectual history of intuition.
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  43. Remarks on collective belief.Margaret P. Gilbert - 1994 - In Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 235-56.
    The author develops and elaborates on her account of collective belief, something standardly referred to, in her view, when we speak of what we believe. This paper focuses on a special response hearers may experience in the context of expressions of belief, a response that may issue in offended rebukes to the speaker. It is argued that this response would be appropriate if both speakers and hearers were parties to what the authors calls a joint commitment to believe (...)
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  44. Seeing and believing: perception, belief formation and the divided mind.Andy Egan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):47 - 63.
    On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It's clear that actual human beings don't live (...)
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  45.  7
    What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In . pp. 1-23.
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  46. Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.
    Is a belief that one will succeed necessary for an intention? It is argued that the question has traditionally been badly posed, framed as it is in terms of all-out belief. We need instead to ask about the relation between intention and partial belief. An account of partial belief that is more psychologically realistic than the standard credence account is developed. A notion of partial intention is then developed, standing to all-out intention much as partial (...) stands to all-out belief. Various coherence constraints on the notion are explored. It is concluded that the primary relations between intention and belief should be understood as normative and not essential. (shrink)
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  47. (1 other version)Acceptance without Belief.Patrick Maher - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:381-392.
    Van Fraassen has maintained that acceptance of a scientific theory does not involve the belief that the theory is true. Blackburn, Mitchell and Horwich have claimed that acceptance, as understood by van Fraassen, is the same as belief; in which case, van Fraassen's position is incoherent. Van Fraassen identifies belief with subjective probability, so the question at issue is really whether acceptance of a theory involves a high subjective probability for the theory. Van Fraassen is not committed (...)
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  48.  53
    Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Part II: Iterated Belief Change Without Dispositional Coherence.Hans Rott - 2003 - Journal of Logic and Computation 13 (1):111-145.
    This paper studies the idea of conservatism with respect to belief change strategies in the setting of unary, iterated belief revision functions (based on the conclusions of Rott, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief, Part I: Finding the Right Framework’, Erkenntnis 50, 1999, 387–412). Special attention is paid to the case of ‘basic belief change’ where neither the (weak) AGM postulates concerning conservatism with respect to beliefs nor the (stong) supplementary AGM postulates concerning dispositional (...)
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  49.  43
    Belief, language, and experience.Rodney Needham - 1972 - Oxford,: Blackwell.
  50. A puzzle about belief reports.Kent Bach - 2000 - In Katarzyna Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Elsevier.
    I'd like to present a puzzle about belief reports that's been nagging at me for several years. I've subjected many friends and audiences to various abortive attempts at solving it. Now it's time to get it off my chest and let others try their hand at it.<1>.
     
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