21 found
Order:
See also
Profile: Patrick Bondy (Saint Mary's University)
  1. Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations.Patrick Bondy - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):542-569.
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The second is to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of the Debasing Demon.Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Descartes’ demon is a deceiver: the demon makes things appear to you other than as they really are. However, as Descartes famously pointed out in the Second Meditation, not all knowledge is imperilled by this kind of deception. You still know you are a thinking thing. Perhaps, though, there is a more virulent demon in epistemic hell, one from which none of our knowledge is safe. Jonathan Schaffer (2010) thinks so. The “Debasing Demon” he imagines threatens knowledge not via the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  70
    Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (4):747-768.
    The following claims are independently plausible but jointly inconsistent: (1) epistemic deontologism is correct (i.e., there are some beliefs we ought to have, and some beliefs we ought not to have); (2) we have no voluntary control over our beliefs; (3) S’s lack of control over whether she φs implies that S has no obligation to φ or to not φ (i.e., ought-implies-can). The point of this paper is to argue that there are active and passive aspects of belief, which (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  27
    Virtues, Evidence, and Ad Hominem Arguments.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Informal Logic 35 (4):450-466.
    Argumentation theorists are beginning to think of ad hominem arguments as generally legitimate. Virtue argumentation theorists argue that a character trait approach to argument appraisal can explain why ad hominems would are legitimate, when they are legitimate. But I argue that we do not need to appeal to virtue argumentation theory to explain the legitimacy of ad hominem arguments; a more straightforward evidentialist approach to argument appraisal is also committed to their legitimacy. I also argue that virtue argumentation theory faces (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  37
    Propositional Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Risk, and Epistemic Justification.Patrick Bondy & Duncan Pritchard - forthcoming - Synthese:1-10.
    If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good evidence in both cases. And yet it clearly does matter. The aim of this paper is to explain why, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Epistemic Circularity, Reliabilism, and Transmission Failure.Patrick Bondy - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):335-348.
    Epistemically circular arguments have been receiving quite a bit of attention in the literature for the past decade or so. Often the goal is to determine whether reliabilists (or other foundationalists) are committed to the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments. It is often assumed that epistemic circularity is objectionable, though sometimes reliabilists accept that their position entails the legitimacy of some epistemically circular arguments, and then go on to affirm that such arguments really are good ones. My goal in this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  63
    Argumentative Injustice.Patrick Bondy - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (3):263-278.
    The aim of this paper is to adapt Miranda Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice to cases of what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too much or little credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to adopt a stance of “metadistrust”—we ought to distrust our inclinations to trust or distrust members of stereotyped groups.
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8.  57
    Introduction [to Logos & Episteme, Special Issue: The Ethics of Belief].Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):397-404.
    This special issue collects five new essays on various topics relevant to the ethics of belief. They shed fresh light on important questions, and bring new arguments to bear on familiar topics of concern to most epistemologists, and indeed, to anyone interested in normative requirements on beliefs either for their own sake or because of the way such requirements bear on other domains of inquiry.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  44
    Epistemic Value.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:0-0.
    This article summarizes recent work by epistemologists on four related problems. (1) The value of knowledge. Briefly, the problem is to explain why knowledge is, or at least appears to be, more valuable than any proper subset of its parts, such as true belief. (2) The value of understanding. The task here is to explain why understanding appears to be more valuable than any epistemic status that falls short of understanding, such as having knowledge without understanding. (3) Truth and epistemic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  66
    How to Understand and Solve the Lottery Paradox.Patrick Bondy - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):283-292.
    It has been claimed that there is a lottery paradox for justification and an analogous paradox for knowledge, and that these two paradoxes should have a common solution. I argue that there is in fact no lottery paradox for knowledge, since that version of the paradox has a demonstrably false premise. The solution to the justification paradox is to deny closure of justification under conjunction. I present a principle which allows us to deny closure of justification under conjunction in certain (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  19
    When Reasons Don’T Work.Patrick Bondy - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is to extend Miranda Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice to what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too little or too much credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to put in place a type of indirect “affirmative action” plan for argument evaluation. I also situate my proposal in Johnson ’s framework of argumentation as an exercise in manifest rationality. -/- *Note: this is an unpublished manuscript (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  18
    The Epistemic Approach to Argument Evaluation: Virtues, Beliefs, Commitments.Patrick Bondy - manuscript
    This paper discusses virtue argumentation theory, as modeled on virtue epistemology. It argues that virtues of argumentation are interesting but parasitic on a more fundamental account of what makes arguments good. -/- *Note: this is an unpublished manuscript presented at the 2013 conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. An electronic copy is available in the Conference Archive, linked above.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  16
    Against Epistemic Circularity.Patrick Bondy & Kevin Delaplante - manuscript
    One finds a surprising number of defenses of the legitimacy of some kinds of question-begging arguments or beliefs in the literature. Without wanting to deny the importance of dialectical analyses of begging the question, what I do here is explore the epistemic side of the issue. In particular, I want to explore the legitimacy of “epistemically circular” arguments and beliefs. My tentative conclusion is that epistemically circular arguments and beliefs are never legitimate. *Note: this is an unpublished manuscript presented at (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  22
    Getting Off the Wheel.Patrick Bondy & Dustin Olson - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):620-637.
    Roderick Chisholm argues that in giving an account of knowledge, we must either begin with an account of what knowledge is, and proceed on that basis to identify the particular things that we know, or else start with instances of knowledge, and proceed on that basis to formulate a definition of knowledge. Either approach begs the question against the other. This is the epistemic wheel. This article responds to Chisholm's challenge. It begins with cases of knowledge attribution and builds its (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  21
    Elijah Chudnoff , Intuition . Reviewed By.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (2):59-62.
  16.  27
    A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief Allan Hazlett Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; 320 Pp.; $84.00. [REVIEW]Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (1):202-204.
  17.  13
    Value, Epistemic.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:0-0.
    Epistemic Value Epistemic value is a kind of value which attaches to cognitive successes such as true beliefs, justified beliefs, knowledge, and understanding. These kinds of cognitive success do of course often have practical value. True beliefs about local geography help us get to work on time; knowledge of mechanics allows us to build vehicles; … Continue reading Value, Epistemic →.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  32
    Intensionality and Epistemic Justification.Patrick Bondy - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):463-475.
    The purpose of this paper is to raise a new objection to externalist process reliabilism about epistemic justification. The objection is that epistemic justification is intensional—it does not permit the substitution of co-referring expressions—and reliabilism cannot accommodate that.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  10
    Value, Epistemic.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epistemic Value Epistemic value is a kind of value which attaches to cognitive successes such as true beliefs, justified beliefs, knowledge, and understanding. These kinds of cognitive success do of course often have practical value. True beliefs about local geography help us get to work on time; knowledge of mechanics allows us to build vehicles; … Continue reading Value, Epistemic →.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  35
    Truth and Argument Evaluation.Patrick Bondy - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (2):142-158.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the claim that arguments are truth-directed, and to discuss the role that truth plays in the evaluation of arguments that are truth-directed. It concludes that the proper place of truth is in the metatheory in terms of which a theory of evaluation is to be worked out, rather than in the theory of evaluation itself as a constraint on premise adequacy.
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity.Patrick Bondy - 2018 - Routledge.
    The aim of this book is to answer two important questions about the issue of normativity in epistemology: Why are epistemic reasons evidential, and what makes epistemic reasons and rationality normative? Bondy's argument proceeds on the assumption that epistemic rationality goes hand in hand with basing beliefs on good evidence. The opening chapters defend a mental-state ontology of reasons, a deflationary account of how kinds of reasons are distinguished, and a deliberative guidance constraint on normative reasons. They also argue in (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography