Objects, Causation, and Scientific Realism

Filozofia 65 (7):643-651 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX


There is a growing pessimism about objects based on the view that objects are mysterious unobservables. According to this line of thought objects can disturb our senses or measuring devices only indirectly, via properties or relations – only properties or relations are observables, not the objects per se. As a result, inaccessible objects open a gap between science and reality and scientific realism is lost. Defenders of objects may respond that the scope of this reasoning is rather limited, because its truth is restricted to very specific views of objects and scientific realism. The paper is concerned with three forms of scientific realism confronting them with three basic ontologies of objects. It appears, then, that seen from the perspective of scientific realism the least problematic picture of objects is given by the Spinozian conception of objects and their modes. However, even this conception faces some difficulties and it seems that the traditional metaphysics is not able to provide a scientifically unproblematic notion of object.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 77,985

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Questions of the objects of knowledge and types of realism.Władysław Krajewski - 1992 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (3):205-213.
The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories.Mark Colyvan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):115 - 123.
Realism: Metaphysical, Scientific, and Semantic.Panu Raatikainen - 2014 - In Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.), Realism, Science, and Pragmatism. Routledge. pp. 139-158.
Hermeneutical Realism and Scientific Observation.Patrick A. Heelan - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:77 - 87.
Realism in Mind.Ricardo Restrepo - 2010 - University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
Scientific Realism: The Truth in Pragmatism.Philip Kitcher - 2012 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1):171-189.
Real Law in Charles Peirce's Pragmaticism.Catherine Legg - 1999 - In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 125--142.
How to be realistic about folk psychology.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.


Added to PP


6 months

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references