Three epistemic paralogisms, one logic of utterances

In P.-E. Bour & M. Rebuschi & L. Rollet (ed.), Construction. Festschrift for Gerhard Heinzmann. pp. 407-416 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Assuming that a paralogism is an unintentionally invalid reasoning, we give an exampli

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Rigor, Reproof and Bolzano's Critical Program.Michael Detlefsen - 2010 - In Pierre Edouard Bour, Manuel Rebuschi & Laurent Rollet (eds.), Construction: A Festschrift for Gerhard Heinzmann. King's College Publications. pp. 171-184.
Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic, Kripke Models and Fitch’s Paradox.Carlo Proietti - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):877-900.
Reasoning About Games.Melvin Fitting - 2011 - Studia Logica 99 (1-3):143-169.
What Kant Should Have Said About Fichte (But Did Not).Plato Tse - 2023 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (2):223-245.
Knowledge, Time, and Paradox: Introducing Sequential Epistemic Logic.Wesley Holliday - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game Theoretical Semantics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 363-394.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-03-09

Downloads
58 (#284,128)

6 months
210 (#13,659)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Fabien Schang
Université de Lorraine (PhD)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The pragmatic paradox of knowledge.E. M. Zemach - forthcoming - Logique Et Analyse.

Add more references