Collins's incorrect depiction of Dreyfus's critique of artificial intelligence

Abstract
Harry Collins interprets Hubert Dreyfus’s philosophy of embodiment as a criticism of all possible forms of artificial intelligence. I argue that this characterization is inaccurate and predicated upon a misunderstanding of the relevance of phenomenology for empirical scientific research
Keywords artificial intelligence  Hubert Dreyfus  Harry Collins  embodiment  phenomenology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11097-006-9039-6
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 32,607
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
42 ( #141,831 of 2,235,927 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #149,891 of 2,235,927 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature