Collins's incorrect depiction of Dreyfus's critique of artificial intelligence

Authors
Evan Selinger
Rochester Institute of Technology
Abstract
Harry Collins interprets Hubert Dreyfus’s philosophy of embodiment as a criticism of all possible forms of artificial intelligence. I argue that this characterization is inaccurate and predicated upon a misunderstanding of the relevance of phenomenology for empirical scientific research
Keywords artificial intelligence  Hubert Dreyfus  Harry Collins  embodiment  phenomenology
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-006-9039-6
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References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

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