This book includes ten essays that trace the notion of unconcealment as it develops from Heidegger's early writings to his later work, shaping his philosophy of truth, language and history. 'Unconcealment' is the idea that what entities are depends on the conditions that allow them to manifest themselves. This concept, central to Heidegger's work, also applies to worlds in a dual sense: first, a condition of entities manifesting themselves is the existence of a world; and second, worlds themselves are disclosed. (...) The unconcealment or disclosure of a world is the most important historical event, and Heidegger believes there have been a number of quite distinct worlds that have emerged and disappeared in history. Heidegger's thought as a whole can profitably be seen as working out the implications of the original understanding of unconcealment. (shrink)
For more than a quarter of a century, Hubert L. Dreyfus has been the leading voice in American philosophy for the continuing relevance of phenomenology, particularly as developed by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Dreyfus has influenced a generation of students and a wide range of colleagues, and these volumes are an excellent representation of the extent and depth of that influence.In keeping with Dreyfus's openness to others' ideas, many of the essays in this volume take the form (...) of arguments with various of his positions. The essays focus on the dialogue with the continental philosophical tradition, in particular the work of Heidegger, that has played a foundational role in Dreyfus's thinking. The sections are Philosophy and Authenticity; Modernity, Self, and the World; and Heideggerian Encounters. The book concludes with Dreyfus's responses to the essays.Contributors : William D. Blattner, Taylor Carman, David R. Cerbone, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Charles Guignon, Michel Haar, Beatrice Han, Alastair Hannay, John Haugeland, Randall Havas, Jeff Malpas, Mark Okrent, Richard Rorty, Julian Young, Michael E. Zimmerman. (shrink)
The Companion begins with a section-by-section overview of Being and Time and a chapter reviewing the genesis of this seminal work. The final chapter situates Being and Time in the context of Heidegger's later work.
Dasein and being-in-the-world -- The world -- The structure of being-in-the-world, pt. 1: Disposedness and moods -- The structure of being-in-the-world, pt. 2: Understanding and interpretation -- Everydayness and the 'one' -- Death and authenticity -- Truth and art -- Language -- Technology -- Our mortal dwelling with things.
I argue in this paper that Heidegger, contrary to the view of many scholars, in fact endorsed a view of truth as a sort of correspondence. I first show how it is a mistake to take Heidegger's notion of 'unconcealment' as a definition of propositional truth. It is thus not only possible but also essential to disambiguate Heidegger's use of the word 'truth', which he occasionally used to refer to both truth as it is ordinarily understood and unconcealment understood as (...) the condition of the possibility of truth. I then show how Heidegger accepted that propositional truth, or 'correctness', as he sometimes called it, consists in our utterances or beliefs corresponding to the way things are. Heidegger's objection to correspondence theories of truth was not directed at the notion of correspondence as such, but rather at the way in which correspondence is typically taken to consist in an agreement between representations and objects. Indeed, Heidegger took his account of unconcealment as explaining how it is possible for propositions to correspond to the world, thus making unconcealment the ground of propositional truth. I conclude by discussing briefly some of the consequences for Heidegger interpretation which follow from a correct understanding of Heidegger's notion of propositional truth. (shrink)
 In _What Computers Can't Do_ (1972), Hubert Dreyfus identified several basic assumptions about the nature of human knowledge which grounded contemporary research in cognitive science. Contemporary artificial intelligence, he argued, relied on an unjustified belief that the mind functions like a digital computer using symbolic manipulations ("the psychological assumption") (Dreyfus 1992: 163ff), or at least that computer programs could be understood as formalizing human thought ("the epistemological assumption") (Dreyfus 1992: 189). In addition, the project depended upon an assumption about (...) the data about the human world which we employ in thought - namely, that it consists of discrete, determinate, and explicit pieces which can be processed heuristically ("the ontological assumption") (Dreyfus 1992: 206). (shrink)
This paper discusses Heidegger's 1931-32 lecture course on The Essence of Truth. It argues that Heidegger read Platonic ideas, not only as stage-setting for the western philosophical tradition's privileging of conceptualization over practice, and its correlative treatment of truth as correctness, but also as an early attempt to work through truth as the fundamental experience of unhiddenness. Wrathall shows how several of Heidegger's more-famous claims about truth, e.g. that propositional truth is grounded in truth as world-disclosure, and including Heidegger's critique (...) of the self-evidence of truth as correspondence, are first revealed in a powerful (if iconoclastic) reading of Plato. (shrink)
S. Kierkegaard argued that our highest task as humans is to realize an “intensified” or “developed” form of subjectivity—his name for self-responsible agency. A self-responsible agent is not only responsible for her actions. She also bears responsibility for the individual that she is. In this paper, I review Kierkegaard’s account of the role that our capacity for reflective self-evaluation plays in making us responsible for ourselves. It is in the exercise of this capacity that we can go from being subjective (...) in a degraded sense—merely being an idiosyncratic jumble of accidental and arbitrary attitudes and affects—to being a subject in the ideal or eminent sense. The latter requires the exercise of my capacity for reflective self-evaluation, since it involves recognizing, identifying with, and reinforcing those aspects of my overall make-up that allow me to express successfully a coherent way of being in the world. Kierkegaard argues that taking immortality seriously is one way to achieve the right kind of reflective stance on one’s own character or personality. Thus, Kierkegaard argues that immortality as a theoretical posit can contribute to one’s effort to own or assume responsibility for being the person one is. (shrink)
This paper develops a modification of the notion of incommensurable worlds upon which Dreyfus and Spinosa base their robust realism. In particular, I argue that we cannot make sense of a conception of incommensurability according to which incommensurable worlds entail cognitively incompatible claims. Instead, as Dreyfus and Spinosa sometimes suggest, incommensurable worlds should be understood as being practically incompatible, meaning that the inhabitants of one world cannot, given their practices for dealing with some things, engage in practices central to the (...) other world. Practical incompatibility grounds a defensible account of incommensurability while securing a necessary step in Dreyfus and Spinosa's argument for robust realism. At the same time, it shows how their idea of incommensurability is immune to the sorts of objections Donald Davidson makes to the idea of a plurality of conceptual schemes, without at the same time refuting Davidson's argument. Finally, an appreciation of the failings of cognitive accounts of incommensurability demonstrates that Dreyfus and Spinosa are not entitled to deny that all true descriptions of the universe are compatible. (shrink)
In this paper, I explore the nature of social rules, including the limitations of most theories of rules which see them either as intentionally followed by, or as objectively describing the behavior of social actors. I argue that a phenomenological description of what it is like actually to be governed by a rule points the way to reconceptualizing the role of social rules in structuring our world and our experience of the world.
Die phänomenologische Tradition war lange Zeit der Auffassung, dass die natürliche Perzeption weder konzeptuell artikuliert ist noch von deterministischen Gesetzen beherrscht wird, sondern dass sie eher nach der praktisch artikulierten Struktur des körperlichen In-der-Welt-Seins organisiert ist. Dabei bleibt die Erklärung dafür problematisch, auf welche Art und Weise die Perzeption dem Denken eine rechtfertigende Unterstützung bieten kann. Die Antwort der Phänomenologen lautet, dass es die bedeutungstragende Struktur der natürlichen Perzeption ist, die uns ermöglicht, über Objekte nachzudenken, indem sie die einzelnen Gedanken (...) über die Objekte motiviert, wie sie sich in der Perzeption darstellen. Der Autor zeigt, welchen Ausweg aus den Sorgen der modernen Philosophie des Geistes dieser Standpunkt weist. (shrink)
Fenomenološka tradicija dugo je smatrala da prirodna percepcija nije ni konceptualno artikulirana niti upravljana determinističkim zakonima, već je radije organizirana prema praktično artikuliranoj strukturi tjelesnog bitka-u-svijetu. Ali to ostavlja problem objašnjavanja kako percepcija može omogućiti opravdavajuću podršku mišljenju. Odgovor fenomenologa jest taj da nam značenjska struktura prirodne percepcije omogućuje da mislimo o objektima motivirajući pojedinačne misli o objektima kakvima se oni predstavljaju u percepciji. Pokazujem kako takvo gledište omogućuje izlaz iz briga koje more suvremenu filozofiju uma.The phenomenological tradition has long (...) contended that natural perception is neither conceptually articulatednor governed by deterministic laws, but rather organized according to the practically articulatedstructure of bodily being-in-the-world. But this leaves the problem of explaining how perceptioncan provide justificatory support to thought. The phenomenologists’ answer is to say thatthe meaningful structure of natural perception makes it possible for us tothink about objects by motivating particular thoughts about the objects as they present themselvesin perception. I show how this view provides a way out of worries that plague contemporary philosophyof mind. (shrink)
La tradition phénoménologique a longtemps considéré que la perception naturelle n’était ni actualisée conceptuellement ni régie par des lois déterministes, mais qu’elle était plutôt organisée d’après la strcture pratiquement articulée de l’être-dans-le-monde physique. Or, cela laisse entier le problème d’explication de la façon dont la perception peut assurer un support justificatif à la pensée. La réponse de la phénoménologie est que c’est la structure significative de la perception naturelle qui nous permet de penser des objets en motivant nons pensées sur (...) ces objets par la manière dont ils se présente à notre perception. Ce pont de vue permet de sortir des problèmes qui tourmentent la philosophie de l’esprit contemporaine. (shrink)
Heidegger and the study of his thought have earned wide acceptance, extending beyond philosophy to influence an array of other disciplines. Critically selected by leading scholars in the field, the articles in this new collection bring together the most essential and representative scholarship on Heidegger. Focusing on the major phases of his work which attracted most attention from contemporary thinkers, as well as exploring new and important areas of Heidegger scholarship, this four-volume set is an invaluable resource for any curriculum (...) supporting philosophy, as well as political theory, literature, classics, anthropology, and cultural studies. This volume is available on its own or as part of the four-volume set, Heidegger Reexamined . For a complete list of the volume titles in this set, see the listing for Heidegger Reexamined [ISBN: 0-415-94041-9]. (shrink)
Although Martin Heidegger is undeniably one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, among the philosophers who study his work we find considerable disagreement over what might seem to be basic issues: why is Heidegger important? What did his work do? This volume is an explicit response to these differences, and is unique in bringing together representatives of many different approaches to Heidegger's philosophy. Topics covered include Heidegger's place in the 'history of being', Heidegger and ethics, Heidegger and (...) theology, and Heidegger and Nazi concepts of race. More generally, the contributors also address their respective visions of the nature of philosophy and the presuppositions which guide their understanding of Heidegger. (shrink)
Hubert L. Dreyfus's engagement with other thinkers has always been driven by his desire to understand certain basic questions about ourselves and our world. The philosophers on whom his teaching and research have focused are those whose work seems to him to make a difference to the world. The essays in this volume reflect this desire to "make a difference"--not just in the world of academic philosophy, but in the broader world.Dreyfus has helped to create a culture of reflection--of questioning (...) the deep premises that inform and shape work in artificial intelligence and cognitive science. He has also been the primary introducer and interpreter of Martin Heidegger's work to the world of information technology. The essays in this volume represent the fruitful application of deep philosophical analysis to the concerns of our modern technological world.The sections are Coping and Intentionality; Computers and Cognitive Science; and "Applied Heidegger." In addition to cognitive science and artificial intelligence, topics include everyday skills, religion, business practices, and medical care. The book concludes with Dreyfus's responses to the essays.Contributors : Daniel Andler, Patricia Benner, Albert Borgmann, Harry Collins, George Downing, Fernando Flores, Sean Kelly, Joseph Rouse, Theodore R. Schatzki, John Searle, Robert C. Solomon, Charles Spinosa, David Stern, Charles Taylor, Terry Winograd, Mark Wrathall. (shrink)
How should we understand religion, and what place should it hold, in an age in which metaphysics has come into disrepute? The metaphysical assumptions which supported traditional theologies are no longer widely accepted, but it is not clear how this 'end of metaphysics' should be understood, nor what implications it ought to have for our understanding of religion. At the same time there is renewed interest in the sacred and the divine in disciplines as varied as philosophy, psychology, literature, history, (...) anthropology, and cultural studies. In this volume, leading philosophers in the United States and Europe address the decline of metaphysics and the space which this decline has opened for non-theological understandings of religion. The contributors include Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, Jean-Luc Marion, Gianni Vattimo, Hubert Dreyfus, Robert Pippin, John Caputo, Adriaan Peperzak, Leora Batnitzky, and Mark Wrathall. (shrink)