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Bursting Bealer’s Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against Quine
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):87-105 (2004)
Abstract
In his 1993 article George Bealer offers three separate arguments that are directed against the internal coherence of empiricism, specifically Quine’s version of empiricism. In doing so, Bealer identifies three fundamental principles of Quine’s empiricism. First, the principle of empiricism states thatMy notes
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Citations of this work
Bealer on the autonomy of philosophical and scientific knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (1):44–54.
References found in this work
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.
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