Noûs 54 (1):3-23 (2020)

Authors
Seth Shabo
University of Delaware
Abstract
The Luck Objection is an influential family of challenges to libertarianism. In recent years, discussions of the Luck Objection have reached an impasse of sorts. On one hand, existing responses to the objection have failed to satisfy libertarianism’s many critics. On the other hand, a growing number of libertarians seem unimpressed by existing formulations of the objection. To break the impasse, I present a two-stage version of the objection. The first stage has the limited objective of showing that supposed exercises of free will resemble certain nonactions in being truly random outcomes. The second stage seeks to show that we aren’t morally responsible for supposed exercises of free will if they are truly random outcomes. The leading idea is that such actions, qua truly random outcomes of our prior mental states, don’t meet a plausible guidance requirement for morally responsible agency.
Keywords Libertarianism  Luck  Free Will  Moral Responsibility
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12243
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References found in this work BETA

Free Will and Luck: Reply to Critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Living Without Free Will.Carl Ginet - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.
Responsibility, Luck, and Chance.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-240.

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Free Will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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