Weak and strong theories of truth

Studia Logica 68 (1):89-101 (2001)
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Abstract

A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength.

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References found in this work

Reflecting on incompleteness.Solomon Feferman - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.
An Axiomatic Approach to Self-Referential Truth.Harvey Friedman & Michael Sheard - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 33 (1):1--21.
How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4):399 - 410.
A System of Complete and Consistent Truth.Volker Halbach - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1):311--27.
A theory of formal truth arithmetically equivalent to ID.Andrea Cantini - 1990 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (1):244 - 259.

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