Weak and strong theories of truth

Studia Logica 68 (1):89-101 (2001)
Abstract
A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Mathematical Logic and Foundations   Computational Linguistics
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1011902222652
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A Proof-Theoretic Account of Classical Principles of Truth.Graham E. Leigh - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (10):1009-1024.

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