Using metascience to improve dose‐response curves in biology: Better policy through better science

Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1026-1037 (2004)
Abstract
Many people argue that uncertain science—or controversial policies based on science—can be clarified primarily by greater attention to social/political values influencing the science and by greater attention to the vested interests involved. This paper argues that while such clarification is necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for achieving better science and policy; indeed its importance may be overemphasized. Using a case study involving the current, highly politicized controversy over the shape of dose‐response curves for biological effects of ionizing radiation, the paper argues that the conflict could be significantly resolved through specific methodological improvements in the areas of metascience and philosophy of science. These improvements focus on taking account, respectively, of scale, data trimming, aggregation, measurability, and simplicity.
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DOI 10.1086/426772
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Mechanistic Information as Evidence in Decision-Oriented Science.José Luis Luján, Oliver Todt & Juan Bautista Bengoetxea - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):293-306.

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