What drives disagreement about moral hypocrisy? Perceived comparability and how people exploit it to criticize enemies and defend allies

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Cognition 247 (C):105773 (2024)
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10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105773

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Features of similarity.Amos Tversky - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (4):327-352.
Construal-level theory of psychological distance.Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (2):440-463.
Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness.Roger Crisp & Christopher J. Cowton - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (4):343 - 349.

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