Authors
Aaron Sloman
University of Birmingham
Abstract
Author comments Rick Grush’s statements about emulation and embodied approach to representation. He proposes his modification of Grush’s definition of emulation, criticizing notion of “standing in for”. He defends of notion of representation. He claims that radical embodied theories are not applicable to all cognition
Keywords cognitive science  emulation  representation  embodied cognition
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Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.

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