About this topic
Summary

Embodied and situated approaches have become increasingly popular in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognition. They tend to be scientifically informed responses to the cognitivism predominant in mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy of mind and psychology. Cognitivism in philosophy assumed - either explicitly or implicitly - that the non-neural body and the environment in which we live and act are best factored out in our investigations of mind and cognition. Embodied and situated approaches along with other related responses to philosophical cognitivism have collectively come to be known as “4EA”: Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and Affective. While 4EA approaches are united in rejecting the conception of mind and cognition as supervenient only upon internal brain processes they each take a slightly different focus on the reasons why internalism should be rejected and the positions may be held independently. For example, what we might think of as orthodox embodied cognitive science makes little or no mention of the affective domain and it does not imply biological enactivism, which - by its very nature - is itself an inherently embodied approach to cognition. In a similar vein, some of these approaches may be thought to be extensions to twentieth century functionalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science, while in others there is a strong historical connection to the Phenomenologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (in particular Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty) and/or the American Pragmatists such as William James and John Dewey. 

Key works

Clark 1996 captured the imagination of a generation of researchers in philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences by drawing on research from robotics to argue that the mind is embodied and embedded in important ways. Gallagher 2005 integrates phenomenology and neuroscience with artificial cognitive systems research to argue that the body shapes the mind. Haugeland 1993 is an early - but classic - paper introducing embodiment and situatedness to philosophy of mind, and Brooks 1991 is the key reference from robotics in the field. Hutchins 1995 is the go-to book on embeddedness, and Dreyfus 1972 still stands as one of the main critiques of traditional artificial intelligence approaches. Enactivism was introduced to the world through Varela et al 1991, developed in detail in regard to what might be thought of as ‘biological’ enactivism in Thompson 2007, in regard to ‘perceptual’ enactivism in Noë 2005, and in regard to perception, agency and consciousness in Hurley 1998. Affective cognition is still underrepresented in the embodiment paradigm but Damasio 1994 and Damasio 1999 have been strong influences on philosophers in this area, Griffiths & Scarantino 2005 presents a strongly situated theory of emotions, and Colombetti 2013 provides an in-depth consideration of affective and emotional embodiment.

Introductions

An overview of most of the 4E approaches is presented in the second edition of Clark's Mindware, an introductory textbook for the philosophy of cognitive science. Clark's Natural Born Cyborgs is a very readable lay-introduction to embodiment and the extended mind, but for a more thorough investigation see Supersizing the Mind. A scientifically informed introduction to the phenomenological approach to these issues is presented in Gallagher and Zahavi's The Phenomenological Mind and Noe's Out of our Heads provides an accessible introduction to perceptual enactivism. A thorough consideration of embodied approaches and their relevance to philosophy of mind can be found in Shapiro's Embodied Cognition and his (2014) edited collection The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition collates cutting-edge articles from many of the key players in the discipline.

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1794 found
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1 — 50 / 1794
  1. How the Brain Makes Up the Mind: A Heuristic Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Dan Bruiger - manuscript
    A solution to the “hard problem” requires taking the point of view of the organism and its sub- agents. The organism constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that are assigned meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history. Phenomenality is a virtual representation, made to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self), which is tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future (...)
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  2. Walking in the Shoes of the Brain: An "Agent" Approach to Phenomenality and the Problem of Consciousness.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    Abstract: Given an embodied evolutionary context, the (conscious) organism creates phenomenality and establishes a first-person point of view with its own agency, through intentional relations made by its own acts of fiat, in the same way that human observers create meaning in language.
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  3. The Intention of Intention.Ramón Casares - manuscript
    For Putnam in "Representation and Reality", there cannot be any intentional science, thus dooming cognitive science. His argument is that intentional concepts are functional, and that functionalism cannot explain anything because "everything has every functional organization", providing a proof. Analyzing his proof, we find that Putnam is assuming an ideal interpreting subject who can compute effortlessly and who is not intentional. But the subject doing science is a human being, and we are not that way. Therefore, in order to save (...)
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  4. Individual Minds as Groups, Group Minds as Individuals.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    This is a long-abandoned draft, written in 2013, of what was supposed to be a paper for an edited collection (one that, in the end, didn't come together). The paper "Group Minds and Natural Kinds" descends from it.
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  5. Keeping HEC in CHEC.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC, hereafter), human cognitive processing extends beyond the boundary of the human organism.1 As I understand HEC, it is a claim in the..
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  6. Extended Cognition, Extended Selection, and Developmental Systems Theory.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    I respond to Karola Stotz's criticisms of my previously published challenges to the inference from developmental systems theory to an extended view of cognition.
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  7. Evolution, Embodiment and the Nature of the Mind.Michael Anderson - manuscript
    In: B. Hardy-Vallee & N. Payette, eds. Beyond the brain: embodied, situated & distributed cognition. (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar’s Press), in press. Abstract: In this article, I do three main things: 1. First, I introduce an approach to the mind motivated primarily by evolutionary considerations. I do that by laying out four principles for the study of the mind from an evolutionary perspective, and four predictions that they suggest. This evolutionary perspective is completely compatible with, although broader than, the embodied cognition (...)
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  8. Evolution, Embodiment and the Nature of the Mind.Author unknown - manuscript
    In: B. Hardy-Vallee & N. Payette, eds. Beyond the brain: embodied, situated & distributed cognition. (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar’s Press), in press. Abstract: In this article, I do three main things: 1. First, I introduce an approach to the mind motivated primarily by evolutionary considerations. I do that by laying out four principles for the study of the mind from an evolutionary perspective, and four predictions that they suggest. This evolutionary perspective is completely compatible with, although broader than, the embodied cognition (...)
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  9. Embodied Cognition and Linguistic Understanding.Daniel A. Weiskopf - manuscript
    Traditionally, the language faculty was supposed to be a device that maps linguistic inputs to semantic or conceptual representations. These representations themselves were supposed to be distinct from the representations manipulated by the hearer.s perceptual and motor systems. Recently this view of language has been challenged by advocates of embodied cognition. Drawing on empirical studies of linguistic comprehension, they have proposed that the language faculty reuses the very representations and processes deployed in perceiving and acting. I review some of the (...)
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  10. Transparency and the Phenomenology of Extended Cognition.Gloria Andrada - forthcoming - Límite: Revista de Filosofía y Psicología.
    Extended cognition brings with it a particular phenomenology. It has been argued that when an artifact is integrated into an agent’s cognitive system, it becomes transparent in use to the cognizing subject. In this paper, I challenge some of the assumptions underlying how the transparency of artifacts is described in extended cognition theory. To this end, I offer two arguments. First, I make room for some forms of conscious thought and attention within extended cognitive routines, and I question the close (...)
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  11. Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 4 of The Peripheral Mind).István Aranyosi - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    The “brain in a vat” thought experiment is presented and refuted by appeal to the intuitiveness of what the author informally calls “the eye for an eye principle”, namely: Conscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes can conceivably successfully be brought about by direct stimulation of the brain, and in all such cases the utilized stimulus field will be in the relevant sense equivalent to the actual PNS or part of it thereof. In the second section, four classic problems (...)
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  12. Margins of Me: A Personal Story (Chapter 1 of The Peripheral Mind).István Aranyosi - forthcoming - In The Peripheral Mind. Philosophy of Mind and the Peripheral Nervous System. Oxford University Press.
    The author presents an autobiographical story of serious peripheral motor nerve damage resulting from chemotoxicity induced as a side effect of Hodgkin’s Lymphoma treatment. The first-person, phenomenological account of the condition naturally leads to philosophical questions about consciousness, felt presence of oneself all over and within one’s body, and the felt constitutiveness of peripheral processes to one’s mental life. The first-person data only fit well with a philosophical approach to the mind that takes peripheral, bodily events and states at their (...)
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  13. How Not to Argue About the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition.Yavuz Recep Başoğlu - forthcoming - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu.
    In theories of cognition, 4E approaches to cognition are seen to refrain from employing robust representations in contrast to Predictive Processing, where such posits are utilized extensively. Despite this notable dissimilarity with regard to posits they employ in explaining certain cognitive phenomena, it has been repeatedly argued that they are in fact compatible. As one may expect, these arguments mostly end up contending either that Predictive Processing is actually nonrepresentational or that 4E approaches are representational. In this paper, I will (...)
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  14. Rhythm in Social Interaction – Introduction.Chiara Bassetti & Emanuele Bottazzi - forthcoming - Rhuthmos.
    This text is the introduction of the special issue “Rhythm in social interaction” edited by Chiara Bassetti and Emanuele Bottazzi in Etnografia e Ricerca Qualitativa, vol. 8, n. 3, December 2015. We thank Chiara Bassetti, Emanuele Bottazzi and the journal Etnografia e Ricerca Qualitativa for the permission to republish it. But, friend, when you grasp the number and nature of the intervals of sound, from high to low, and the boundaries of those intervals, and how many scales arise from them, (...)
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  15. Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory.Erin Beeghly - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-17.
    .Can we treat people in a discriminatory way in virtue of how we think about them? In this essay, I argue that the answer is yes. According to the constitutive claim, stereotyping constitutes discrimination, either sometimes or always. This essay defends the constitutive claim and explores the deeper justifications for it. I also sketch the constitutive claim’s larger ethical significance. One upshot is that we can wrongfully discriminate against (or in favor of) others in thought, even if we keep our (...)
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  16. Are Basic Actors Brainbound Agents? Narrowing Down Solutions to the Problem of Probabilistic Content for Predictive Perceivers.George Britten-Neish - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.
    Clark (2018) worries that predictive processing accounts of perception introduce a puzzling disconnect between the content of personal-level perceptual states and their underlying subpersonal representations. According to PP, in perception, the brain encodes information about the environment in conditional probability density distributions over causes of sensory input. But it seems perceptual experience only presents us with one way the world is at a time. If perception is at bottom probabilistic, shouldn’t this aspect of subpersonally represented content show up in consciousness? (...)
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  17. Advances in Austrian Economics.William Butos, Roger Koppl & Steve Horwitz (eds.) - forthcoming - Emerald.
  18. 9th Embodied and Situated Language Processing Conference.Ciencia Cognitiva - forthcoming - Ciencia Cognitiva.
    Ernesto Guerra, Macarena Silva, Edmundo Kronmüller Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile Universidad de Chile, … Read More →.
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  19. Loving and Knowing: Reflections for an Engaged Epistemology.Hanne De Jaegher - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    In search of our highest capacities, cognitive scientists aim to explain things like mathematics, language, and planning. But are these really our most sophisticated forms of knowing? In this paper, I point to a different pinnacle of cognition. Our most sophisticated human knowing, I think, lies in how we engage with each other, in our relating. Cognitive science and philosophy of mind have largely ignored the ways of knowing at play here. At the same time, the emphasis on discrete, rational (...)
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  20. Extending the Extended Consciousness Debate: Perception, Imagination, and the Common Kind Assumption.James Deery - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    For some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as (...)
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  21. Self, Me and I in the Repertoire of Spontaneously Occurring Altered States of Selfhood: Eight Neurophenomenological Case Study Reports.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts & Tarja Kallio-Tamminen - forthcoming - Cognitive Neurodynamics.
    This study investigates eight case reports of spontaneously emerging, brief episodes of vivid altered states of Selfhood (ASoSs) that occurred during mental exercise in six long-term meditators by using a neurophenomenological electroencephalography (EEG) approach. In agreement with the neurophenomenological methodology, first-person reports were used to identify such spontaneous ASoSs and to guide the neural analysis, which involved the estimation of three operational modules of the brain self-referential network (measured by EEG operational synchrony). The result of such analysis demonstrated that the (...)
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  22. Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science.S. J. Gapenne & E. Di Paolo (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
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  23. Call-for-Papers: Third Special Issue in the Series Cognition and Technology: Mechanicism and Autonomy: What Can Robotics Teach Us About Human Cognition and Action?Maria Eunice Q. Gonzalez, Willem Ed Haselager & Itiel Ed Dror - forthcoming - Pragmatics and Cognition.
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  24. Embodied Higher Cognition: Insights From Merleau-Ponty’s Interpretation of Motor Intentionality.Jan Halák - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-29.
    This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s original account of “higher-order” cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case (...)
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  25. Dancing-With: A Method for Poetic Social Justice.Joshua M. Hall - forthcoming - In Rebecca L. Farinas, Craig Hanks, Julie C. Van Camp & Aili Bresnahan (eds.), Dance and Philosophy. London:
    This chapter outlines a new theoretical method, which I call “dancing-with,” emerging from the process of writing my dissertation and the book manuscript that followed it. Defined formally, a given theorist X can be said to “dance-with” with a second theorist Y insofar as X “choreographs” an interpretation of Y which is both true to Y and Y’s historical communities, and also meaningful and actionable (i.e. facilitating social justice) for X and X’s historical communities. In this pursuit, the method of (...)
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  26. Re-conceptualizing the role of stimuli: an enactive, ecological explanation of spontaneous-response tasks.Alan Jurgens - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    This paper addresses a challenge proposed against non-mindreading explanations of infant spontaneous-response task data. The challenge is a foundational assumption of mindreading explanations best summed up by Carruthers : 141-172, 2013, Consciousness and Cognition, 36: 498-507, 2015) claim that only by appealing to a theory of mind is it possible to explain infant responses in spontaneous-response false-belief tasks when there are no one-to-one correspondences between observable behavior and mental states. Heyes, 131–143, 2014a, Developmental Science, 17, 647–659. b) responds to this (...)
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  27. The Brittleness of Expertise and Why It Matters.Daniel Kilov - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    Expertise has become a topic of increased interest to philosophers. Fascinating in its own right, expertise also plays a crucial role in several philosophical debates. My aim in this paper is to draw attention to an important, and hitherto unappreciated feature of expertise: its brittleness. Experts are often unable to transfer their proficiency in one domain to other, even intuitively similar domains. Experts are often unable to flexibly respond to changes within their domains. And, even more surprisingly, experts will occasionally (...)
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  28. Decision-Making in Shiatsu Bodywork: Complementariness of Embodied Coupling and Conceptual Inference.Michael Kimmel & Christine Irran - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-31.
    “4E” cognitive science has demonstrated that embodied coupling offers powerful resources for reasoning. Despite a surge of studies, little empirical attention is paid to discussing the precise scope of these resources and their possible complementariness with traditional knowledge-based inference. We use decision-making in Shiatsu practice – a bodywork method that employs hands-on interaction with a client – to showcase how the two types of cognitive resources can mesh and offer alternative paths to a task: “Local” resources such as embodied presence, (...)
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  29. Philosophy of the Social Mind.Julian Kiverstein (ed.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
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  30. James, Nonduality, and the Dynamics of Pure Experience.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Lee A. Mcbride Iii & Erin McKenna (eds.), Pragmatist Feminism and the Work of Charlene Haddock Seigfried.
  31. Watsuji's Phenomenology of Aidagara: An Interpretation and Application to Psychopathology.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In S. Taguchi & Andrea Altobrando (eds.), Tetsugaku Companion to Phenomenology and Japanese Philosophy. Springer. pp. 165-181.
    I discuss Watsuji’s characterization of aidagara or “betweenness”. First, I develop a phenomenological reading of aidagara. I argue that the notion can help illuminate aspects of our embodied subjectivity and its interrelation with the world and others. Along the way, I also indicate how the notion can be fruitfully supplemented by different sources of empirical research. Second, I put aidagara to work in the context of psychopathology. I show how disruptions of aidagara in schizophrenia not only affirm the foundational role (...)
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  32. Music as Affective Scaffolding.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In David Clarke, Ruth Herbert & Eric Clarke (eds.), Music and Consciousness II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    For 4E cognitive science, minds are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. Proponents observe that we regularly ‘offload’ our thinking onto body and world: we use gestures and calculators to augment mathematical reasoning, and smartphones and search engines as memory aids. I argue that music is a beyond-the-head resource that affords offloading. Via this offloading, music scaffolds access to new forms of thought, experience, and behaviour. I focus on music’s capacity to scaffold emotional consciousness, including the self-regulative processes constitutive of emotional (...)
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  33. Direct Social Perception.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Albert Newen, Leon de Bruin & Gallagher Shaun (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition.
  34. Musical Scaffolding and the Pleasure of Sad Music: Comment on “An Integrative Review of the Enjoyment of Sadness Associated with Music".Joel Krueger - forthcoming - Physics of Life Reviews.
    Why is listening to sad music pleasurable? Eerola et al. convincingly argue that we should adopt an integrative framework — encompassing biological, psycho-social, and cultural levels of explanation — to answer this question. I agree. The authors have done a great service in providing the outline of such an integrative account. But in their otherwise rich discussion of the psycho-social level of engagements with sad music, they say little about the phenomenology of such experiences — including features that may help (...)
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  35. Embodiment and Affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia: A Phenomenological Analysis.Joel Krueger & Mads Gram Henriksen - forthcoming - In J. Aaron Simmons & James Hackett (eds.), Phenomenology for the 21st Century. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In this comparative study, we examine experiential disruptions of embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological resources to explore these experiences may help us better understand what it’s like to live with these conditions, and that such an understanding may have significant therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort of phenomenologically-informed comparative analysis can shed light on the importance of embodiment and affectivity for the constitution of a sense of self and interpersonal relatedness (...)
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  36. Towards a Wide Approach to Improvisation.Joel Krueger & Alessandro Salice - forthcoming - In J. McGuirk, S. Ravn & S. Høffding (eds.), Improvisation: The Competence(s) of Not Being in Control. New York, NY, USA:
    This paper pursues two main aims. First, it distinguishes two kinds of improvisation: expert and inexpert. Expert improvisation is a (usually artistic) practice that the agent consciously sets as their goal and is evaluated according to (usually artistic) standards of improvisation. Inexpert improvisation, by contrast, supports and structures the agent’s action as it moves them towards their (usually everyday life) goals and is evaluated on its success leading the agent to the achievement of those goals. The second aim is to (...)
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  37. Losing Social Space: Phenomenological Disruptions of Spatiality and Embodiment in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia.Joel Krueger & Amanda Taylor Aiken - forthcoming - In Jack Reynolds & Ricky Sebold (eds.), Phenomenology and Science. Palgracve Macmillan.
    We argue that a phenomenological approach to social space, as well as its relation to embodiment and affectivity, is crucial for understanding how the social world shows up as social in the first place—that is, as affording different forms of sharing, connection, and relatedness. We explore this idea by considering two cases where social space is experientially disrupted: Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We show how this altered sense of social space emerges from subtle disruptions of embodiment and affectivity characteristic of (...)
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  38. Why Pretense Poses a Problem for 4E Cognition.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    Whether a person is pretending, or not, is a function of their beliefs and intentions. This poses a challenge to 4E accounts of pretense, which typically seek to exclude such cognitive states from their explanations of psychological phenomena. Resulting tensions are explored within three recent accounts of imagination and pretense offered by theorists working in the 4E tradition. A path forward is then charted, through considering ways in which explanations can invoke beliefs and intentions while remaining true to 4E precepts. (...)
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  39. Enseigner Loral En Interaction: Percevoir, Écouter.E. Lhote - forthcoming - Comprendre.
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  40. .Victor Loughlin - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Andy Clark once remarked that we make the world smart so we don�t have to be. What he meant was that human beings alter and transform their environments in order to accomplish certain tasks that would prove difficult without such transformations. This remarkable insight goes a long way towards explaining many aspects of human culture, ranging from linguistic notational systems to how we structure our cities. It also provides the basis for Mark Rowlands� thought-provoking and insightful book, The New Science (...)
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  41. On Biologising Racism.Raamy Majeed - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    To biologise racism is to treat racism as a neurological phenomenon susceptible to biochemical intervention. In 'Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong About the Struggle for Racial Injustice', Kahn (2018) critiques cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists for framing racism in a way that tends to biologise racism, which he argues draws attention and resources away from non-individualistic solutions to racial inequality. In this paper I argue the psychological sciences can accommodate several of Kahn’s criticisms by adopting a situated (...)
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  42. The Interaction Theory of Social Cognition–a Critique.John Michael - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
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  43. Embodied Anticipation in Neurocomputational Cognitive Architectures for Robotic Agents.Alberto Montebelli, Robert Lowe & Tom Ziemke - forthcoming - The Swedish Ai Society Workshop May 27-28, 2009 Ida, Linköping University.
  44. Do Sensorimotor Dynamics Extend the Conscious Mind?Ken Pepper - forthcoming - Adaptive Behavior.
    According to the extended conscious mind thesis (ECM), the physical basis of consciousness is not confined exclusively to the brain, but extends beyond it via sensorimotor dynamics. ECM is enjoying growing support among philosophers inspired by developments in enactive and embodied cognitive science. ECM has obvious parallels with the extended mind thesis (EM), according to which the physical basis of cognition is likewise not confined to the brain. However, EM’s originator and most prominent defender, Andy Clark, argues that EM theorists (...)
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  45. Embodied Agency and Habitual Selves.Nancy Nyquist Potter - forthcoming - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):75-80.
  46. Embodiment and Cognitive Neuroscience: The Forgotten Tales.Vicente Raja - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    In this paper, I suggest that some tales developed in the literature of embodied and radical embodied cognitive science can contribute to the solution of two longstanding issues in the cognitive neuroscience of perception and action. The two issues are the fundamental problem of perception, or how to bridge the gap between sensations and the environment, and the fundamental problem of motor control, or how to better characterize the relationship between brain activity and behavior. In both cases, I am going (...)
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  47. Visual Acquaintance, Action & The Explanatory Gap.Thomas Raleigh - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
    Much attention has recently been paid to the idea, which I label ‘External World Acquaintance’ (EWA), that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is partially constituted by external features. One motivation for EWA which has received relatively little discussion is its alleged ability to help deal with the ‘Explanatory Gap’ (e.g. Fish 2008, 2009, Langsam 2011, Allen 2016). I provide a reformulation of this general line of thought, which makes clearer how and when EWA could help to explain the specific (...)
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  48. Group Minds and Natural Kinds.Robert D. Rupert - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies.
    The claim is frequently made that structured collections of individuals who are themselves subjects of mental and cognitive states – such collections as courts, countries, and corporations – can be, and often are, subjects of mental or cognitive states. And, to be clear, advocates for this so-called group-minds hypothesis intend their view to be interpreted literally, not metaphorically. The existing critical literature casts substantial doubt on this view, at least on the assumption that groups are claimed to instantiate the same (...)
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  49. Enacting the aesthetic: A model for raw cognitive dynamics.Carlos Vara Sánchez - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    One challenge faced by aesthetics is the development of an account able to trace out the continuities and discontinuities between general experience and aesthetic experiences. Regarding this issue, in this paper, I present an enactive model of some raw cognitive dynamics that might drive the progressive emergence of aesthetic experiences from the stream of general experience. The framework is based on specific aspects of John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy and embodied aesthetic theories, while also taking into account research in ecological psychology, (...)
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  50. Lectures on Perspective An Ecological Approach.Miguel Segundo-Ortin - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
1 — 50 / 1794