Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap

Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46 (1999)
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Abstract

One point of view on consciousness is constituted by two claims

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Citations of this work

On the causal completeness of physics.Agustín Vicente - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.
Consciousness and Reduction.Ausonio Marras - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):335-361.
Carnap, the necessary a priori, and metaphysical anti-realism.Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 81-104.
The Q factor: Modal rationalism versus modal autonomism.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):365-380.
Two Conceivability Arguments Compared.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44.

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