A Metaphysics for Freedom

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Helen Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,031

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Metaphysics for Freedom. [REVIEW]Philip Clark - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (4):558-561.
Agency and Determinism in A Metaphysics for Freedom.Sarah Broadie - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (6):571-582.
A Metaphysics for Freedom by Helen Steward. [REVIEW]Yu Liu - 2015 - Review of Metaphysics 69 (1):155-156.
Agency and Incompatibilism. [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):519-525.
The metaphysics of freedom.Bernard Berofsky - 1977 - Journal of Chinese Philosophy 4 (2):161-186.
Dretske on the metaphysics of freedom.Hugh J. McCann - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):619-630.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-04-15

Downloads
197 (#104,821)

6 months
18 (#152,314)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Helen Steward
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Naturalism.Davidn D. Papineau - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Are abilities dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.

View all 166 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references