A Metaphysics for Freedom

Oxford University Press (2012)

Authors
Helen Steward
University of Leeds
Abstract
Helen Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.
Keywords Free will and determinism  Agent (Philosophy  Causation
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Reprint years 2014
Call number BJ1461.S695 2012
ISBN(s) 9780199552054   9780198706465
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Attitudinal Control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.
Agency and Two‐Way Powers.Maria Alvarez - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):101-121.
Are Abilities Dispositions?Barbara Vetter - forthcoming - Synthese 196 (1).
Agent Causation as a Solution to the Problem of Action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.
Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Hanna Pickard - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):135-163.

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