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Agency and Incompatibilism [Book Review]
Res Philosophica 91 (3):519-525 (2014)
Abstract
This paper is part of a symposium discussing Helen Steward's A METAPHYSICS FOR FREEDOM. Steward argues for what she calls Agency Incompatibilism: agency itself is incompatible with determinism. This paper examines what Steward presents as her main argument for Agency Incompatibilism and finds it wanting.Author's Profile
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Similar books and articles
Assessing the Argument for Agency Incompatibilism.Karin E. Boxer - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (6):583-596.
Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions.Magill Kevin - 1997 - London: author open access, originally MacMillan.
Settling and Bodily Control.Christos Douskos - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (6):639-652.
Are We Agents at All? Helen Steward's Agency Incompatibilism.Neil Levy - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):386-399.
The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility.Helen Steward - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):241-271.
Agency and Determinism in A Metaphysics for Freedom.Sarah Broadie - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (6):571-582.
Welche Fähigkeiten gäbe es in einer deterministischen Welt?Geert Keil - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):5-28.
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Citations of this work
Time, Leeway, and the Laws of Nature: Why Humean Compatibilists Cannot Be Eternalists.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (1):51-71.
The Disappearing Agent.Filip Čeč - 2017 - In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. University of Rijeka. pp. 235-253.
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