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Siblings:History/traditions: Philosophy of Action, Misc

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  1. Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding?Fred Adams & Annie Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...)
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  2. Agency, Consciousness, and Executive Control.Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.
    On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the proper role of (...)
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  3. New Waves in Philosophy of Action.Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
  4. Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions.Jesus Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.) - 2009 - Automatic Press/VIP.
  5. Defending Fundamental Requirements of Practical Reason: A Constitutivist Framework.David Alm - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:77-102.
    In this paper I offer a partial defense of a constitutivist view according to which it is possible to defend fundamental requirements of practical reason by appeal to facts about what is constitutive of rational agency. I show how it is possible for that approach to circumvent the ‘is’/’ought’ problem as well as the requirement that it be possible to act contrary to practical reason. But I do not attempt to establish any particular fundamental requirement. The key ideas are that (...)
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  6. Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.
    Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the phenomena of “being settled on” and of “settling” a course of action. For many, this connection supports an important constraint on intention: one may only intend what one takes one’s so intending as settling. Traditionally, this has been understood as a doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one’s intention as settling is what one believes one’s so intending as (...)
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  7. Reductive Views of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. Routledge.
    This is a survey article on reductive views of shared intention.
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  8. An Unconditioned Will: The Role of Temporality in Freedom and Agency.Roman Altshuler - 2010 - Dissertation, SUNY Stony Brook
    Eliminativists about free will and moral responsibility argue that no action can be free and responsible because in order to be actions, our movements must be caused by features of our character or will. However, either the will is constituted by states that are themselves produced by events outside our control, or it is constituted by our own choices, which must themselves stem from our will in order to be up to us. Thus, any attempt to account for freedom and (...)
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  9. Agency and the A-Series.Roman Altshuler - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):153-161.
  10. Time and the Philosophy of Action.Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.) - 2016 - Routledge.
    Although scholarship in philosophy of action has grown in recent years, there has been little work explicitly dealing with the role of time in agency, a role with great significance for the study of action. As the articles in this collection demonstrate, virtually every fundamental issue in the philosophy of action involves considerations of time. The four sections of this volume address the metaphysics of action, diachronic practical rationality, the relation between deliberation and action, and the phenomenology of agency, providing (...)
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  11. Uma análise crítica das relações entre cognição, paixões e ação na perspectiva cartesiana.Marcos Antonio Alves - 2016 - Revista Estudos Filosóficos 16:55-74.
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  12. Educations and Their Purposes: A Conversation Among Cultures.Roger T. Ames & Peter Herschock (eds.) - 2007 - University of Hawai'i Press.
    In this volume, representatives of different cultures and with alternative conceptions of human realization explore themes at the intersection of a changing ...
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  13. Acknowledging Ralph Pred.Weekes Anderson - forthcoming - In Jakub Dziadkowiec & Lukasz Lamza (eds.), Beyond Whitehead: Recent Advances in Process Thought. Lanham: Lexington Books. pp. 97–114.
    At the time of his death in May of 2012, Ralph Pred was working on a critical social theory inspired by process philosophy. In the book manuscript he left unfinished, Syntax and Solidarity, he develops a “radically empirical” sociology that enables him to identify and critically evaluate the different forms that social solidarity has taken in the history of civilization. The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the importance of his unfinished project. The executors of Pred’s literary (...)
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  14. Parity, Comparability, and Choice.Chrisoula Andreou - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (1):5-22.
    It is often supposed that, given two potential objects of choice X and Y, a specific set of circumstances, and a specific choosing agent, one of the following must be true: (1) opting for X is a better choice than opting for Y, (2) opting for Y is a better choice than opting for X, or (3) opting for X and opting for Y are exactly equally good choices. My aim in this paper is to show how some philosophical insights (...)
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  15. The Good, the Bad, and the Trivial.Chrisoula Andreou - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):209-225.
    Dreadful and dreaded outcomes are sometimes brought about via the accumulation of individually trivial effects. Think about inching toward terrible health or toward an environmental disaster. In some such cases, the outcome is seen as unacceptable but is still gradually realized via an extended sequence of moves each of which is trivial in terms of its impact on the health or environment of those involved. Cases of this sort are not only practically challenging, they are theoretically challenging as well. For, (...)
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  16. Understanding Procrastination.Chrisoula Andreou - 2007 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (2):183–193.
    Procrastination is frustrating. Because the procrastinator's frustration is self-imposed, procrastination can also be quite puzzling. I consider attempts at explaining, or explaining away, what appear to be genuine cases of procrastination. According to the position that I propose and defend, genuine procrastination exists and is supported by preference loops, which can be either stable or evanescent.
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  17. Temptation and Deliberation.Chrisoula Andreou - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):583-606.
    There is a great deal of plausibility to the standard view that if one is rational and it is clear at the time of action that a certain move, say M1, would serve one’s concerns better than any other available move, then one will, as a rational agent, opt for move M1. Still, this view concerning rationality has been challenged at least in part because it seems to conflict with our considered judgments about what it is rational to do in (...)
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  18. Cognitive Behavioural Systems.Esposito Anna, Esposito Antonietta M., Hoffmann Rüdiger, Müller Vincent C. & Vinciarelli Alessandro (eds.) - 2012 - Springer.
    This book constitutes refereed proceedings of the COST 2102 International Training School on Cognitive Behavioural Systems held in Dresden, Germany, in February 2011. The 39 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from various submissions. The volume presents new and original research results in the field of human-machine interaction inspired by cognitive behavioural human-human interaction features. The themes covered are on cognitive and computational social information processing, emotional and social believable Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) systems, behavioural and contextual analysis (...)
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  19. Causality and Determination.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1993 - In E. Sosa M. Tooley (ed.), Causation. Oxford Up. pp. 88-104.
  20. Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis.Avery Archer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):140-156.
    According to the Strong Belief Thesis (SBT), intending to X entails the belief that one will X. John Brunero has attempted to impugn SBT by arguing that there are cases in which an agent intends to X but is unsure that she will X. Moreover, he claims that the standard reply to such putative counterexamples to SBT – namely, to claim that the unsure agent merely has an intention to try – comes at a high price. Specifically, it prevents SBT (...)
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  21. Do We Need Partial Intentions?Avery Archer - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):995-1005.
    Richard Holton has argued that the traditional account of intentions—which only posits the existence of all-out intentions—is inadequate because it fails to accommodate dual-plan cases; ones in which it is rationally permissible for an agent to adopt two competing plans to bring about the same end. Since the consistency norms governing all-out intentions prohibit the adoption of competing intentions, we can only preserve the idea that the agent in a dual-plan case is not being irrational if we attribute to them (...)
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  22. Why Care About Being an Agent?Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):488-504.
    The question ‘Why care about being an agent?’ asks for reasons to be something that appears to be non-optional. But perhaps it is closer to the question ‘Why be moral?’; or so I shall argue. Here the constitutivist answer—that we cannot help but have this aim—seems to be the best answer available. I suggest that, regardless of whether constitutivism is true, it is an incomplete answer. I argue that we should instead answer the question by looking at our evaluative commitments (...)
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  23. What We Can Intend: Recognition and Collective Intentionality.Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):5-26.
    The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others’ right to self-determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of what (...)
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  24. Review Essay: Chant, Sara Rachel, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer, Editors. From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. [REVIEW]Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (3):318–331.
    I summarize and evaluate the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the on-going debate about collective intentionality and group agency. I then consider the individual essays contained therein, both from the perspective of how they advance the collection’s goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.
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  25. Review: Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. [REVIEW]Caroline T. Arruda - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):258-262.
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  26. Chimps as Secret Agents.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2129-2158.
    We provide an account of chimpanzee-specific agency within the context of philosophy of action. We do so by showing that chimpanzees are capable of what we call reason-directed action, even though they may be incapable of more full-blown action, which we call reason-considered action. Although chimpanzee agency does not possess all the features of typical adult human agency, chimpanzee agency is evolutionarily responsive to their environment and overlaps considerably with our own. As such, it is an evolved set of capacities (...)
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  27. A General Theory of Acts, with Application to the Distinction Between Rational and Irrational 'Social Cognition'.A. Y. Aulin-Ahmavaara - 1977 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 8 (2):195-220.
    A general theory of acts leads to a theory of cognition distinguishing between formation of apriorical knowledge about values, norms, and cognitive beliefs, based on conditioning by means of rewards and punishments, and formation of aposteriorical knowledge based on conscious, theoretical analysis of observations. The latter, rational layer of consciousness can be built on the former, irrational layer only, if certain conditions are fulfilled. It is shown that rational cognition of values presupposes a notion of aposteriorical value, which challenges some (...)
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  28. A Plea for Excuses.John Austin - 1956 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:1--30.
    The subject of this paper, Excuses, is one not to be treated, but only to be introduced, within such limits. It is, or might be, the name of a whole branch, even a ramiculated branch, of philosophy, or at least of one fashion of philosophy. I shall try, therefore, first to state what the subject is, why it is worth studying, and how it may be studied, all this at a regrettably lofty level: and then I shall illustrate, in more (...)
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  29. El Influjo Del Entendimiento Sobre la Voluntad Según Francisco Zumel, Mercedario (1540-1607).L. K. B. - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 15 (3):528-528.
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  30. Action-Oriented Research in Education: A Comparative Study on A Western and An Islamic View.Khosrow Bagheri Noaparast & Mohammad Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast - 2012 - AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL SCIENCES 29 (2):43-63.
    Comparative studies among cultures, particularly Western and Eastern ones, are vital and necessary. In this essay, we are presenting a comparison between Western and Islamic views. The focus of this study is on action-oriented educational research based on Charles Clark’s view as a more recent action-oriented view on educational research. The comparison between Clark’s view and the one we suggest that is inspired by the Islamic view of human action and shows that there are considerable commonalities between the two views (...)
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  31. Pain and Action.David Bain - manuscript
    While many agree that unpleasant pains motivate, little attention has been paid to this idea’s action-theoretic significance, to what kind of motivation pains are, or to the status of the behaviour they motivate. I claim that some pain behaviour belongs to a neglected category. For it is not brute behaviour, but action; yet it is not motivated by desires or intentions, nor like other behaviour that philosophers construe as neither brute nor desire-motivated, such as habitual action. Rather it is what (...)
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  32. “Tätigsein Und Die Erste-Person-Perspektive” (Agency and the First-Person Perspective).Lynne Rudder Baker - 2008 - In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was Sind Menschliche Personen? Onto Verlag.
    It is no news that you and I are agents as well as persons. Agency and personhood are surely connected, but it is not obvious just how they are connected. I believe that being a person and being an agent are intimately linked by what I call a ‘first-person perspective’: All persons and all agents have first-person perspectives. Even so, the connection between personhood and agency is not altogether straightforward. There are different kinds of agents, and there are different kinds (...)
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  33. Interpretation in Action: A Preliminary Inquiry.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2005 - In Fernando Mão de Ferro (ed.), A Explicação da Interpretação Humana (Portuguese). Edições Colibri.
    The term ‘human interpretation’ itself has two interpretations: interpretation by human beings and interpretation of human beings. We are all familiar with both kinds of interpretation in ordinary life. Marie interprets Sam’s remark as a sexual invitation; Joseph interprets the famous guest’s attire as an insult to the host. But as the organizers of our conference point out, we have no systematic explanation of human interpretation—either ‘of’ or ‘by’ human beings. Before embarking on a theory of human interpretation, however, we (...)
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  34. Indeterminate Permissibility and Choiceworthy Options.Adam Bales - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1693-1702.
    Various people have claimed that some cases involve indeterminate permissibility. However, it’s unclear what guidance one can take away from this fact: are indeterminately permissible options choiceworthy and if so when? In this paper, I present a counterexample that undermines two existing responses to this question and I then present two alternative solutions that avoid this counterexample.
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  35. Intentional Scraps.R. L. Barnette - 1975 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):13-20.
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  36. Immoral Beliefs.Bana Bashour - 2013 - Ratio 26 (3):299-309.
    In this paper, I argue that there exists a class of immoral beliefs. These beliefs are immoral not for the usual reasons, i.e. because of their tendency to cause harm, their immoral acquisition, or the fact that they involve unjustified moral judgments. Rather, the class of beliefs to which I wish to draw attention includes beliefs that do not even have any moral content, but whose non-moral content is still morally significant. These beliefs are immoral because holding them constitutes an (...)
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  37. ¿ Se puede saber lo que se quiere?Peter Baumann - 1995 - Ideas Y Valores 44 (96-97):3-22.
    Can one come to know what one wants? In some very simple cases, the answer has to be positive but in some other cases the answer is not so clear. The answer depends on what kind of self-knowledge one is taking about. This article also aims at elucidating the notion of knowledge of one's own desires.
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  38. In the Realm of Agents.Nuel Belnap & Michael Perloff - unknown
    Stit theory (a logic of seeing-to-it-that) is applied to cases involving many agents. First treated are complex nestings of stits involving distinct agents. The discussion is driven by the logical impossibility of "a sees to it that b sees to it that Q" in the technical sense, even though that seems to make sense in everyday language, Of special utility are the concepts of "forced choice", of the creation of deontic states, and of probabilities, Second, joint agency, both plain and (...)
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  39. El manifiesto del método. Ensayo de interpretación de las Tesis sobre Feuerbach de Karl Marx.Carlos Bendana-Pedroza - 2015 - Bendana-Pedroza pdf.
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  40. Nonpropositional Intellectualism.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-195.
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  41. A Defense of Psychological Egoism.Scott Berman - 2003 - In Naomi Reshotko (ed.), Desire, Identity and Existence. Academic Printing and Publishing.
    The purpose of this paper is to argue for psychological egoism, i.e., the view that the ultimate motivation for all human action is the agent’s self-interest. Two principal opponents to psychological egoism are considered. These two views are shown to make human action inexplicable. Since the reason for putting forward these views is to explain human action, these views fail. If psychological egoism is the best explanation of human action, then humans will not differ as regards their motivations for their (...)
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  42. Self-Deception and Selectivity: Reply to Jurjako.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):91-95.
    Marko Jurjako’s article “Self-deception and the selectivity problem” (Jurjako 2013) offers a very interesting discussion of intentionalist approaches to self-deception and in particular the selectivity objection to anti-intentionalism raised in Bermúdez 1997 and 2000. This note responds to Jurjako’s claim that intentionalist models of self-deception face their own version of the selectivity problem, offering an account of how intentions are formed that can explain the selectivity of self-deception, even in the “common or garden” cases that Jurjako emphasizes.
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  43. The Commonsense Conception and its Relation to Scientific Theory.Henk Bij de Weg - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):17 – 30.
    In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O - which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality - and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from (...)
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  44. Attribution d'états mentaux et justification de l'action.Renée Bilodeau - 1985 - Dialogue 24 (4):639-653.
    Plusieurs auteurs se sont inspirés des thèses du deuxième Wittgenstein pour proposer une nouvelle approche en sciences sociales qui viserait la justification plutôt que l'explication de l'action. Sur la base d'une étude de trois types d'énoncés formulés grâce au langage de l'action (factuels, normatifs et attributifs d'états mentaux), cet article évalue les difficultés et possibilités d'une telle suggestion.
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  45. Causal Pluralism and the Problem of Natural Agency.John Bishop - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):527-536.
  46. Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action.John Bishop - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behaviour, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the scepticism of many philosophers who have argued that 'free will' is impossible under 'scientific determinism'. This scepticism is best overcome, according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that (...)
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  47. Searle on Natural Agency.John Bishop - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):282 – 300.
  48. Sensitive and Insensitive Responses to Deviant Action.John Bishop - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):452 – 469.
  49. Keim Und Grundlinie.Ernst Bloch - 1953 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 1 (JG).
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  50. Philosophy of Action, by Lilian O'Brien. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2017 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 21 (3).
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