Being Wrong: Logics for False Belief

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (3):245-253 (2011)
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Abstract

We introduce an operator to represent the simple notion of being wrong. Read Wp to mean: the agent is wrong about p . Being wrong about p means believing p though p is false. We add this operator to the language of propositional logic and study it. We introduce a canonical model for logics of being wrong, show completeness for the minimal logic of being wrong and various other systems. En route we examine the expressiveness of the language. In conclusion, we discuss an open question regarding K4

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Author's Profile

Christopher Steinsvold
Brooklyn College (CUNY)

References found in this work

The Logic of Non-contingency.I. L. Humberstone - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (2):214-229.
Minimal Non-contingency Logic.Steven T. Kuhn - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (2):230-234.
Completeness and Definability in the Logic of Noncontingency.Evgeni E. Zolin - 1999 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (4):533-547.
A Note on Logics of Ignorance and Borders.Christopher Steinsvold - 2008 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (4):385-392.
Necessity and contingency.M. J. Cresswell - 1988 - Studia Logica 47 (2):145 - 149.

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