Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):527-545 (2000)
Skepticism about the external world may very well be correct, so the question is in order: what theory of knowledge flows from skepticism itself? The skeptic can give a relatively simple and intuitive account of knowledge by identifying it with indubitable certainty. Our everyday ‘I know that p’ claims, which typically are part of practical projects, deploy the ideal of knowledge to make assertions closely related to, but weaker than, knowledge claims. The truth of such claims is consistent with skepticism; various other vexing problems don’t arise. In addition, even if no claim about the world outside my mind can be more probable than its negation, the project of pure scientific research remains well motivated
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Contextualism and Warranted Assertion.Jim Stone - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
Similar books and articles
Skepticism, Self-Knowledge and Responsibility.David Macarthur - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier. pp. 97.
The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud.W. Wong, N. Kolodny & J. Bridges (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):327-343.
Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second-Order Skepticism.Alexander S. Harper - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.
Skepticism and the Value of Knowledge.Patrick Hawley - 2007 - In Chienkuo Mi Ruey-lin Chen (ed.), Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads409 ( #6,010 of 2,178,142 )
Recent downloads (6 months)32 ( #8,576 of 2,178,142 )
How can I increase my downloads?