Defending conventions as functionally a priori knowledge

Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1149-1160 (2003)
Abstract
Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correctsome elements of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a functionally a priori part of our physical theory. I will argue that the former a priori should be treated as empirical in a very abstract sense, but still conventional. Though actually coming closer to the Quinean position than recent defenses of a priori knowledge, the picture of science developed here is very different from that developed in Quinean holism in that categories of knowledge can be differentiated.
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DOI 10.1086/377396
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A Place for Pragmatism in the Dynamics of Reason?Thomas Mormann - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 27 - 37.
Theory Change, Structural Realism, and the Relativised a Priori.Dan McArthur - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):5 – 20.
A Place for Pragmatism in the Dynamics of Reason?Thomas Mormann - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):27-37.

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