Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):149-172 (2000)
Symbols should be grounded, as has been argued before. But we insist that they should be grounded not only in subsymbolic activities, but also in the interaction between the agent and the world. The point is that concepts are not formed in isolation (from the world), in abstraction, or "objectively." They are formed in relation to the experience of agents, through their perceptual/motor apparatuses, in their world and linked to their goals and actions. This paper takes a detailed look at this relatively old issue, with a new perspective, aided by our work of computational cognitive model development. To further our understanding, we also go back in time to link up with earlier philosophical theories related to this issue. The result is an account that extends from computational mechanisms to philosophical abstractions
|Keywords||Cognitive Science Computation Objectivity Science Symbol|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Autonomous Generation of Symbolic Representations Through Subsymbolic Activities.Ron Sun - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):888 - 912.
Semiosis in Cognitive Systems: A Neural Approach to the Problem of Meaning. [REVIEW]Eliano Pessa & Graziano Terenzi - 2007 - Mind and Society 6 (2):189-209.
On Peirce's Pragmatic Notion of Semiosis—a Contribution for the Design of Meaning Machines.João Queiroz & Floyd Merrell - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):129-143.
Similar books and articles
Grounding Symbols in Sensorimotor Categories with Neural Networks.Stevan Harnad - 1995 - Institute of Electrical Engineers Colloquium on "Grounding Representations.
Incompatible Implementations of Physical Symbol Systems.Peter beim Graben - 2004 - Mind and Matter 2 (2):29-51.
The Search for Mind: A New Foundation for Cognitive Science.Seán Ó Nualláin - 2002 - Intellect.
Defending the Dynamic Hypothesis.Tim van Gelder - 1999 - In Wolfgang Tschacher & J-P Dauwalder (eds.), Dynamics, Synergetics, Autonomous Agents: Nonlinear Systems Approaches to Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive Science. Singapore: World Scientific.
Symbol Grounding and the Symbolic Theft Hypothesis.Angelo Cangelosi, Alberto Greco & Stevan Harnad - 2002 - In A. Cangelosi & D. Parisi (eds.), Simulating the Evolution of Language. Springer Verlag. pp. 191--210.
Symbol Grounding in Computational Systems: A Paradox of Intentions.Vincent C. Müller - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):529-541.
Symbol Grounding is an Empirical Problem: Neural Nets Are Just a Candidate Component.Stevan Harnad - manuscript
Computation is Just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation; Cognition Isn't.Stevan Harnad - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):379-90.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads50 ( #104,964 of 2,171,972 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #326,556 of 2,171,972 )
How can I increase my downloads?