Are We Embodied Souls?

Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):83-87 (2021)
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Abstract

It is argued that Swinburne should stress the functional unity of soul and body under most healthy conditions. Too often, critics of substance dualism charge dualists with promoting a problematic bifurcation between soul and body. Swinburne’s work is defended against objections from Thomas Nagel. It is argued that Swinburne’s appeal to the first-person point of view is sound.

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Charles Taliaferro
St. Olaf College

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The virtues of embodiment.Charles Taliaferro - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (1):111-125.

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