Authors
Jamie Tappenden
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
This paper uses the strengthened liar paradox as a springboard to illuminate two more general topics: i) the negation operator and the speech act of denial among speakers of English and ii) some ways the potential for acceptable language change is constrained by linguistic meaning. The general and special problems interact in reciprocally illuminating ways. The ultimate objective of the paper is, however, less to solve certain problems than to create others, by illustrating how the issues that form the topic of this paper are more intricate than previously realised, and that they are related in delicate and somewhat surprising ways.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,232
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207.
Cheap Contextualism.Peter Ludlow - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):104-129.
Deep Inconsistency.Matti Eklund - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):321-331.
Carnap’s Tolerance, Meaning, and Logical Pluralism.Greg Restall - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):426 - 443.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
93 ( #98,780 of 2,329,876 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #392,703 of 2,329,876 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes