Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1):51-67 (2004)
The Franklin defence of meat-eating is the claim that meat-eating is morally permissible because animals eat other animals. I examine five versions of this defence. I argue that two versions, claiming respectively that might is right and that animals deserve to be eaten, can easily be dismissed, and that the version based on a claim that God intends us to eat animals is theologically controversial. I go on to show that the two other versions—one claiming that meat-eating is natural, the other that it is inconsistent to condemn human meat-eating without also trying to prevent animals eating other animals—present some difficulties for the moral vegetarian
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Vegetarianism, Sentimental or Ethical?Jan Deckers - 2009 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 22 (6):573-597.
Industrial Farm Animal Production: A Comprehensive Moral Critique.John Rossi & Samual A. Garner - 2014 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 27 (3):479-522.
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