Hume and Intrinsic Value: D. A. Lloyd Thomas

Philosophy 65 (254):419-437 (1990)

Abstract
In this essay an ‘objective’ account of intrinsic value is proposed and partly defended. It is claimed that a kind of value exists which is, or may reasonably be supposed to be, a property of certain objects. The presence of such value is not to be wholly accounted for as the ‘projection’ of certain human feelings elicited by the object thought to be of value, nor by the object's meeting certain operative human conventions prescribing what is to be admired, nor by its being conformable, in some way, to human needs or desires. Hume, of course, would have none of this. It is hoped to show that if one adopts Hume's account, then his attempt to show that there nevertheless will be convergence in the long run as to what is of aesthetic value is forced and unsuccessful. By contrast, on the ‘objective’ account convergence is to be expected. This, of course, only shows the superiority of the ‘objective’ account so long as there is an expectation of long-term convergence. This is not an expectation of most contemporary value ‘subjectivists’, and therefore the argument will not be directly relevant to their positions
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819100064664
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,951
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Hume and Intrinsic Value.D. A. Lloyd Thomas - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (254):419 - 437.
Hume's Absolute Necessity.Thomas Holden - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):377-413.
Newton of the Mind: An Examination of Hume's Science of Human Nature.Mark David Collier - 1999 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
Does Kant Refute Hume’s Derivation of the Concept of Cause?Gregg Osborne - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:293-318.
Hume's Theory of Motivation.Daniel Shaw - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (1):163-183.
Hume on the Distinction of Reason.Paul Hoffman - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (6):1131 - 1141.
Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause.Leo Groarke & Graham Solomon - 1991 - Journal of the History of Ideas 52 (4):645-663.
Hume's Theory of the Self.Saul Philip Traiger - 1984 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume's Moral Psychology.Rico Vitz - 2004 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (3):261-275.
Hume’s Projectivist Legacy for Environmental Ethics.Paul Haught - 2006 - Environmental Ethics 28 (1):77-96.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-02-04

Total views
19 ( #418,026 of 2,235,908 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #232,956 of 2,235,908 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature