Abstract

This article contributes to the philosophical debate over whether and how different forms of value interact—more specifically, moral and aesthetic value. Whereas much of the debate has been preoccupied with how moral value might affect aesthetic value, this article explores the interaction from the opposite direction. To consider the plausibility of an interaction in this direction, I first expand upon Robert Stecker’s brief discussion of the reverse affective response argument. Following this, I propose an alternative description of an aesthetic-moral interaction that might be more accurately described as “inverted moderate moralism.” Inverted moderate moralism (an inverted version of Noël Carroll’s moderate moralism) argues that aesthetic value sometimes affects moral value; sometimes aesthetic flaws yield moral flaws in works, and sometimes aesthetic merits yield moral merits. I defend inverted moderate moralism as one plausible account of aesthetic-moral value interaction, but this article hopes to illustrate that an interaction in this direction is not only plausible but warrants further consideration more generally.