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Self-awareness and self-knowledge
Abstract
Higher-order theories and neo-Brentanian theories of consciousness both consider conscious states to be states of which we have some sort ofAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness.Jonathan Farrell & Tom McClelland - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):1-22.
Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.
First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):947-969.
Consciousness, self-consciousness, and meditation.Wolfgang Fasching - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):463-483.
Affording introspection: an alternative model of inner awareness.Tom McClelland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2469-2492.
References found in this work
Meditations on First Philosophy.René Descartes - 1984 [1641] - Ann Arbor: Caravan Books. Edited by Stanley Tweyman.
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
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