Fine‐tuning, weird sorts of atheism and evidential favouring

Analytic Philosophy (3):1-12 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper defends a novel sceptical response to the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God (FTA). According to this response, even if FTA can establish, what I call, the confirmation proposition: ‘fine-tuning confirms the God hypothesis’, there is no reason to think that a strengthening of FTA can establish the evidence-favouring proposition: ‘fine-tuning favours the God hypothesis over its competitors’. My argument is that, any criteria for the explanation of fine-tuning that permit us to take the God hypothesis seriously ought to make us sceptical that fine-tuning favours the God hypothesis over its competitors. As taking the God hypothesis seriously requires us to give a fair hearing to all sorts of non-theistic explanations, including the so-called weird sorts of atheism.

Similar books and articles

The case against atheism.Tj Mawson - 2013 - In Stephen Bullivant & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press. pp. 22.
Undermining the case for evidential atheism.Paul K. Moser - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (1):83 - 93.
The fine-tuning argument.Neil A. Manson - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):271-286.
Evil and the god of indifference.László Bernáth & Daniel Kodaj - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (3):259-272.
Fine-Tuning Fine-Tuning.John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 136-168.
Misapprehensions about the Fine-Tuning Argument.John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81:133-155.
Four (Or So) New Fine-Tuning Arguments.Lydia McGrew - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (2):85--106.
The fine-tuned universe and the existence of God.Man Ho Chan - 2017 - Dissertation, Hong Kong Baptist University
Fine-tuning as evidence for a multiverse: why White is wrong. [REVIEW]Mark Douglas Saward - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):243-253.


Added to PP

197 (#65,614)

6 months
67 (#17,323)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Likelihoodism and Guidance for Belief.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):501-517.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Design Argument.Elliott Sober - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.
The Existence of God.Richard Swinburne - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.
A Treatise on Probability.J. M. Keynes - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):219-222.

View all 27 references / Add more references