Escaping the Consequences: Two Problems in Consequentialist Moral Theory

Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University (2001)
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Abstract

Consequentialism says that we should do whatever brings about the best results. The appeal of consequentialism seems to lie in the way it captures the common sense idea that if we know the results of one action will be better than the results of another, we should choose the action leading to the better results. ;Still many have noted that consequentialism will lead us to conclusions that conflict with some of our firmly held moral beliefs. I investigate two of these areas of conflict in an effort to better understand the attraction and the repulsion consequentialist theory tends to inspire. First, I investigate whether consequentialism allows us to maintain our notion of integrity. Next, I consider whether consequentialism is compatible with moral rules. ;I argue that the demands of consequentialism are not as great as some suggest and that the requirements of integrity are not as formidable or complete as they appear. If we develop consequentialism and look realistically at our moral practice, the problems with integrity yield. ;Consequentialism makes no special place for moral rules. Consequentialism suggests that following rules even when one can get better results by breaking them is irrational, and therefore consequentialists reject rules. This rejection of rules relies on some common notions of value and rationality. Thus the rejection appears compelling and threatens even our fundamental moral rules. However, the notions of value and rationality at work, though common, are inadequate. We must enrich our understanding of both values and rationality to achieve a fuller and more accurate picture of our moral and rational practices. A broader picture of values and rationality dispels the fear of irrationality and shows us how we can support rules of morality and why we maintain them. ;This defense of rules suggests how consequentialist reasoning fits into a larger picture of morality. Consequentialism may not provide an adequate theory of the whole of morality, but consequentialist reasoning---doing what brings about the best results---may still have a place in morality

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