Rawls on Liberty and Domination

Res Publica 15 (4):397-413 (2009)

Abstract

One of the central elements of John Rawls’ argument in support of his two principles of justice is the intuitive normative ideal of citizens as free and equal. But taken in isolation, the claim that citizens are to be treated as free and equal is extremely indeterminate, and has virtually no clear implications for policy. In order to remedy this, the two principles of justice, together with the stipulation that citizens have basic interests in developing their moral capacities and pursuing their conceptions of the good life, are meant to provide a more precise interpretation of what is involved in treating citizens as free and equal. Rawls’ critics, however, have argued that satisfying the two principles of justice is not the most appropriate or plausible way to respect the status of citizens as free and equal. In relation to this debate, the present paper has two aims. The first is to examine Rawls’ account of the type of freedom that a just society must guarantee equally to its citizens. I will argue that those who think of Rawls as a theorist of freedom as non-interference are mistaken, because his notion of liberty resembles in important respects the republican notion of freedom as non-domination. Second, I will consider the extent to which Rawls’ principles of justice successfully protect the freedom as non-domination of all citizens so as to effectively treat them as free and equal

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Author's Profile

M. Victoria Costa
College of William and Mary

References found in this work

Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Harvard University Press.
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.C. L. Ten - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):563-566.
Collected Papers.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work

The Neorepublican Challenge to Egalitarian-Liberalism: Evaluating Justifications of Redistributive Institutions.Jürgen Sirsch & Doris Unger - 2021 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 24 (7):1000-1023.
Kant: A Republican Conception of Public Justice.Maria Julia Bertomeu - 2018 - Las Torres de Lucca. International Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (13):109-126.

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