The social context of scientific knowledge production and the problem of demarcation

Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (3):527-568 (2006)
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Abstract

In this paper, I wish to face the old problem of demarcation from a new point of view. I aim at pointing out that there are distinction criteria between scientific and non-scientific knowledge. I intend to investigate whether it is possible to define demarcation criteria by studying the social dimension of science. There are social necessities, which force the scientific production of knowledge to distinguish itself from non-scientific production. Science is not what scientists freely decide it should be, but what they are compelled to acknowledge it is. The paper discusses the nature of this constraint, which has a social origin but is also capable to be reflected on the cognitive contents of science. Through a discussion of the theories of Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu, attention is drawn on the cycle of credibility as the crucial social mechanism determining scientific knowledge.

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