Informal Logic 24 (3):219-243 (2004)

Authors
David Godden
Michigan State University
Abstract
The standard account of denying the antecedent (DA) is that it is a deductively invalid form of argument, and that, in a conditional argument, to argue from the falsity of the antecedent to the falsity of the consequent is always fallacious. In this paper, we argue that DA is not always a fallacious argumentative strategy. Instead, there is a legitimate usage of DA according to which it is a defeasible argument against the acceptability of a claim. The dialectical effect of denying the antecedent is to shift the burden of proof back to the original proponent of a claim. We provide a model of this non-fallacious usage which is built upon pragmatic models of argumentation
Keywords argument  argumentation  conditional  denying the antecedent  fallacy  rebuttal  refutation
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References found in this work BETA

The Development of Logic.William Kneale & Martha Kneale - 1962 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.
Introduction to Logical Theory.Peter Frederick Strawson - 1952 - London, England: Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.
Ranking Theory and Conditional Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (4):848-880.

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