Towards a taxonomy of modes of moral decision-making

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):563-564 (2005)

Abstract

Sunstein advocates a more systematic approach to the study of moral decision-making, namely the heuristics-and-biases paradigm. We offer two concerns and suggest that a focus on decision processes can add value. Recent research on decision modes suggest that it is useful to distinguish between the qualitative differences in the ways in which moral decisions can be made when they are not made by reflective, consequentialist reasoning.

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No Need to Get Emotional? Emotions and Heuristics.Andras Szigeti - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):845-862.

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