Argumentation 16 (4):459-472 (2002)

Abstract
In this paper I argue for modesty concerning what theoretical reason can accomplish in the moral dilemmas debate. Specifically, I contend that philosophers' conclusions for or against moral dilemmas are driven less by rational argument and more by how the moral world intuitively appears to them
Keywords David Brink  deontic logic  inescapable wrongdoing  moral conflict  moral dilemmas  the moral dilemmas debate  tragic dilemmas
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DOI 10.1023/A:1021182606590
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Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands.Michael Walzer - 1973 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (2):160-180.
Ethical Consistency.B. A. O. Williams & W. F. Atkinson - 1965 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 39 (1):103-138.

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