The Moral Dilemmas Debate, Deontic Logic, and the Impotence of Argument

Argumentation 16 (4):459-472 (2002)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue for modesty concerning what theoretical reason can accomplish in the moral dilemmas debate. Specifically, I contend that philosophers' conclusions for or against moral dilemmas are driven less by rational argument and more by how the moral world intuitively appears to them

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References found in this work

Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands.Michael Walzer - 1973 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (2):160-180.
Ethical Consistency.B. A. O. Williams & W. F. Atkinson - 1965 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 39 (1):103-138.

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