Risk's Place in Decision Rules

Synthese 126 (3):427-441 (2001)
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Abstract

To handle epistemic and pragmatic risks, Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982, 1988) design a decision procedure for cases in which probabilities are indeterminate. Their procedure steps outside the traditional expected utility framework. Must it do this? Can the traditional framework handle risk? This paper argues that it can. The key is a comprehensive interpretation of an option's possible outcomes. Taking possible outcomes more broadly than Gärdenfors and Sahlin do, expected utility can give risk its due. In particular, Good's (1952) decision procedure adequately handles indeterminate probabilities and the risks they generate.

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2009-01-28

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Paul Weirich
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.
Breaking the law of desire.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (3):295-319.

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References found in this work

Probability and the Art of Judgment.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1992 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Expected utility and risk.Paul Weirich - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):419-442.

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