Philosophical Quarterly 37 (October):423-32 (1987)

Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University
The nature of consciousness has long been a central concern for philosophers of the mind. My purpose in this paper is to argue that it is the existence of some unconscious mental states which poses problems for the action theory of belief. Showing their existence to be compatible with theory is not straightforward, and requires an account of unconscious belief and desire which is at odds with that favoured by many action-theorists.
Keywords Belief  Mental States  Metaphysics  Unconscious
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DOI 10.2307/2219572
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