Why God's beliefs are not hard-type soft facts

Religious Studies 38 (1):77-88 (2002)
John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: (1) God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘hard-type soft facts’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; (2) in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to the fixity of the past. In this paper, I take issue with this argument by Fischer, claiming that it does not succeed for two reasons: (i) Fischer's account of the notion of a hard property is unsatisfactory; (ii) his notion of a hard-type soft fact is incoherent. Despite this criticism, I agree with Fischer that there is a fundamental difference between God's beliefs about the future and regular soft facts with regard to their fixity-status, but I argue that the reason for this difference is that God's forebeliefs are plain hard facts about the past.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0034412501005911
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive David Widerker, Why God's beliefs are not hard-type soft facts
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Manuel de Pinedo (2004). Truth Matters: Normativity in Thought and Knowledge. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (2):137-154.
Eric T. Olson (2006). Imperfect Identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):247–264.
William Lane Craig (1986). Temporal Necessity; Hard Facts/Soft Facts. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (2/3):65 - 91.
John Martin Fischer (1986). Hard-Type Soft Facts. Philosophical Review 95 (4):591-601.
John R. Shook (2006). God's Justified Knowledge and the Hard-Soft Fact Distinction. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 8:69-73.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

38 ( #126,953 of 1,925,522 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #96,508 of 1,925,522 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.