Philosophical Inquires 2 (1):59-75 (2014)
AbstractIn George Sher’s recent article “Out of Control”, he discusses a series of 9 cases that he believes illustrates that some agents are uncontroversially morally responsible for actions they “cannot help” but perform (2006: 285). He argues these agents exert partial control over these actions insofar as their actions are determined from their character; but this is no control at all. Here I argue that in each of these cases the agent exerts morally relevant control over her actions and that none of these are genuine instances of moral luck, nor counterexamples to the control principle.
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Citations of this work
Leibniz and Huayan Buddhism: Monads as Modified Li?Casey Rentmeester - 2014 - Lyceum 13 (1):36-57.
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