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Intuitionism Disproved?
Analysis 42 (4):203--7 (1982)
Abstract
Perennial philosophers' hopes are unlikely victims of swift, natural deduction. Yet anti-realism has been thought one. Not hoping for anti-realism myself I here show it, lest it be underestimated, to survive the following argument, adapted from W. D.Hart pp. 156, 164-5; he credits first publication to Fitch)My notes
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Citations of this work
Factive knowability and the problem of possible omniscience.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):65-87.
Fitch's proof, verificationism, and the knower paradox.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
Indefinite extensibility and the principle of sufficient reason.Geoffrey Hall - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):471-492.
Intuitionistic epistemic logic.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):266-298.
The Ontology of Justifications in the Logical Setting.Sergei N. Artemov - 2012 - Studia Logica 100 (1-2):17-30.
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