``Knowability and Constructivism"

Philosophical Quarterly 38 (53):422-432 (1988)

If anti-realism is defined as the principle that all truths are knowable, then anti-realists have a reason to revise logic. For an argument first published by Fitch seems to reduce anti-realism to absurdity within classical but not constructivist logic. One might try to sever this link between anti-realism and revisionism in logic by giving either a modified version of anti-realism not vulnerable to Fitch's argument within classical logic or a modified version of Fitch's argument to which anti-realism is vulnerable within constructivist logic.
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DOI 10.2307/2219707
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On the Road to Antirealism∗1.Gregory Currie - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):465-483.
Fitch's Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
Intuitionistic epistemic logic.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):266-298.

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