Abstract
The anti?Cartesian idea that a person's thoughts are not entirely fixed by what goes on inside that person's head is suggested by Hegel, and echoed in Wittgenstein and Frege. An argument for the view has recently been given by Tyler Burge. This paper claims that Burge's data can be explained better by an individualistic theory. The basic idea is that an individual's thoughts are specified analogically, in ordinary discourse, through the model of a language. Though the modelling?sentences are public, the thoughts of the individual are inner states whose identity does not depend upon those sentences. They have content naturally, whether or not content happens to be ascribed to them
Keywords Epistemology  Language  Sentence  Thought  Burge, T
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DOI 10.1080/00201748208601979
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
The Thought: A Logical Inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.
Philosophical Papers.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Incorrect Understanding and Concept Possession.Halvor Nordby - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):55-70.
Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions.Pierre Jacob - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (4):301-325.
Mental Content and the Division of Epistemic Labour.Christopher Gauker - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (3):302-18.

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