The Mohist Notion of Gongyi

Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 19 (2):269-287 (2020)
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Abstract

The Mohists develop the concept of yi 義 to denote what is morally right in a normative sense. We argue that this concept has, as one of its necessary conditions, a requirement to not harm others. Additionally, we will show that the motivation of developing this concept is that it can be both universalized and publicly agreed upon, thus serving the Mohists’ endeavor to overcome human conflicts that make the world chaotic and unlivable. We argue therefore that the Mohist notion of gongyi 公義 is best captured by the requirement of “not harming.” Moreover, we shall show that the Mohists themselves committed to this requirement as the first principle of all their core doctrines. Finally, we argue that due to the justifiability and universalizability of the requirement of “not harming,” the Mohists’ commitment to it as a prerequisite normatively justifies their other values in a way that was unprecedented at the time.

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Amin Ebrahimi Afrouzi
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Mohism.Chris Fraser - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Mencius and early Chinese thought.Kwong-loi Shun - 1997 - Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
The Complete Works of Zhuangzi.Burton Watson (ed.) - 2013 - Columbia University Press.

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